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PREFACE 
The body of this dissertation is composed of three separated essays. The first 
essay was.written with a focus on the information that i~ contained in-the Producer 
Subsidy Equivalent. To compare the public assistance provided to the agriculture sector 
in various countries an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) known as the Producer 
S~bsidy Equivalent (PSE) was developed. ij:owever, the PSE.only measures the total 
level of support provided to agriculture, major changes in policies at equal levels of 
support can not be differentiated through this indicator. 
There is valuable information embedded in the PSE indicator, that can allow to 
approximate the impact of domestic policies on trade. To achieve such a goal, a tool 
that permits to account for the vertical and horizontal price linkages between 
agricultural markets is needed. The analysis of the information included in the PSE can 
give more direction of the relationship of the economic variables that need to be capture 
in an economic model to offer,a more complete ireatment of impact of agricultural 
policies. 
The second essay focuses in a methodology to analyze policy changes in the 
agricultural sector. A Policy Evaluati.on Methodology (PEM) is developed to measure 
lll 
the impacts on trade of domestic agricultural policies. The PEM considers the price 
transmission between agricultural input, production and output markets to estimate the 
distribution of the price and income support policies between producers and consumers. 
An index is generated which enables an across country and commodity comparison of 
the portion of the total government outlays received by the producers and the associated 
. degree trade distortion. 
Essay three cover the analysis of the Federal Agricultural Improvement Reform 
Act of 1996 using the methodology, The Policy Evaluation Methodology enables one to 
make a comparison of the impacts of agricultural policies· on producers, consumers, 
taxpayers and trade. The approach separates the assumptions about input supply and 
input demand elasticities and which markets are directly impacted by each policy. When 
analysing the effect of changes of the FAIR ACT, the effects of each policy applied 
individually is different from the effect of implementing the mix of policies at the same 
time, and even more important, the increase or decrease in the amount of transfer given 
is not necessarily shown in the effects of that support·in the commodity market or the 
factor markets since policies use different price linkages to transmit their effect. 
However, this information is left out of the PSE/CSE indicator.· On the other hand, the 
mix of policies shows the presence of substitution and compensation effects producing 
income and trade distortions sometimes less severe than the application of the set of 
policies individually. This information is also left out of the PSE/CSE. 
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ESSAY I 
Measuring the Impact of Public Support Policies 
I 
Measuring the Impact of Public Support Policies 
Abstract 
· To compare the public assistance provided to the agriculture sector in various 
countries an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) known as the Producer Subsidy 
Equivalent (PSE) was developed. However, the PSE only measures the total level of 
support provided to agriculture, major changes in policies at equal levels of support can 
not be differentiated through this indicator. 
There is valuable information embedded inthe PSE indicator, that can allow to 
approximate the impact of domestic policies on trade. To achieve such a goal, a tool . 
that permits to account. for the vertical and horizontal price linkages between 
agricultural markets is needed. The analysis of the information included in the PSE can 
give more direction of the relationship of the economic variables that need to be capture 
in an economic model to offer a more complete treatment of impact of agricultural 
policies. 
Keywords: Producer Subsidy Equivalent., Agricultural Policy, Trade, World 
Trade Organization. 
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Measuring the Impact of Public Support Policies 
Introduction 
To compare the public assistance provided to th.e agriculture sector 
across countries an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) known as the Producer 
Subsidy Equivalent (PSE)was developed by the F AO in the 1970's and adopted by the 
OECD in the 19801s·. The PSE was used to indicatethe level of public support provided 
to agriculture producers, but did not actually measure·the share of that support actually 
recieved by producers or measure the impact of that support on agricultural production, 
prices or trade. Generally, the PSE assumed that every public <;lollar spent in agriculture 
as a producer subsidy was retained as benefits by the producer. 
The level and type of public support provided to agriculture. will affect the degree 
to which the public policies induce changes in agricultural output and prices and 
distortions in trade. Because the PSE provides only a measure of the total level of 
support provided to agriculture, major changes in policies at equal levels of support can 
not he differentiated. Thus, a new AMS is needed to describe what happens to trade 
distortions as changes in public policies occur. 
The components of the PSE can be used to measure the impact of domestic . 
policies on trade by accounting for the vertical and horizontal price linkages between 
agricultural markets. The income transferred from consumers and taxpayers to 
producers through public policies will be shared as benefits by input suppliers, output 
service industries and consumers as well as producers. The market structure and 
characteristics and the type of policy instrument will affect how the benefits are 
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distributed between each business and consumer involved in the agricultural market. 
Thus, domestic policy choices, even if passively pursued, may influence domestic price 
and quantities produced and consumed, economy-wide employment and economic 
activity, and result in international transfers of gains and losses. 
Intervention in th~ agricultural sector may have an imp~ct on trade either directly 
(through border measures) or indirectly (affecting the levels of production or 
consumption). These impacts across countries will differ depending on the mix of 
policies and the level of support. The level of complexity and diversity of policies and 
programs used to support agriculture differs markedly across countries. 
Government Policy and Subsidies 
The key priority for government policies is establishing the right price and 
incentive structure, promoting sustainable development and reducing program waste and 
budget deficits. A market failure results when markets do not· reflect the full costs and 
I 
benefits of production in the price of traded products and inputs. The lack of markets or 
information for some inputs, is also classed as a market failure. (Sutton, 1988) 
Government invovlement is often pursued to correct for market failures but often 
creates new distortions. These policy failures (market distortions resulting from active 
government involvement) have been identified from sectoral subsidies, inappropriate 
pricing, taxation policies, price .controls and regulations. A market failure implies.a lack 
of government action, but does notimplythat the mar~ets cannot work (Sutton, 1988). 
The concepts of market and policy failure can be applied to distinguish subsidies 
from externalities. Economic theory indicates that in efficient markets, private welfare is 
maximized when prices equal marginal private cost. Any deviation from this optimal 
4 
allocation will lead to inefficiencies(Sutton, 1988). Government policies may create these 
deviations causing lower or higher prices than optimal (e.g. price controls). These 
inefficiencies may arrise from government subsidies and acrue to different groups in 
society. 
Subsidies are policies that keep prices for consumers below the mar~et level or 
keep prices for producers above the market level or that reduce costs for consumers by 
giving direct or indirect support (De Moore, 1997) . This definition di!ferentiates 
between budgetary and market transfers and the between production and consumption 
subsidies. The OECD has classified subsidies based on the method or the origin of the 
transfer (Table 1 ). 
T bl 1 T a e rs b ·d· b M th d rT axonomy o u SI 1es ,y e 0 0 fi rans er 
Method of Transfer Type of Subsidies 
Budgetary Subsidies a) Direct Subsidies: e.g. grants or payments to consumers or producers. 
. 'b) Budgetary effect of tax policies: e.g. tax credits, exemptions, 
allowances, exclusions and deductions, rate relief, preferential tax treatment 
Public provisions of goods and services below cost. e.g. complementary services and government R&D expenditures. 
Capital cost subsidies e.g. preferential loans, loan or liability guarantees, debt forgiveness. 
Policies that create transfers through the market a) Domestic-oriented poUcles : e.g.,.price regulation, quantity controls, 
mechanism government procurement policies, legislation. 
b) Trade -oriented policies: e.g. import and export tariff and non-tariffs 
barriers. 
Source: OECD, 1997 
Direct subsidies are public expenditures categorized by the OECD, as budgetary 
subsidies. Subsidies such as those arrising from tax policies are located in the revenue 
side of governments accounts. Capital cost subsidies are a separate off-budget 
component and are distinct from direct transfers so they do not show up in government · 
accounts. They arise from policies that reduce the cost of capital or the financial burden, 
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such as loans, favorable interest, liability guarantees, debt forgiveness. 
Finally, there are subsidies that may result from policies that create off-budget 
transfers through the market mechanism. Here, domestic and international policies must 
be distinguished. Domestic policies encompass a broad variety of measures including 
minimum price guarantees, quantity controls, price regulations, and government 
procurement practices and restrictive tendering procedures. 
The level of government involvement through programs, transfers and other 
means provides information not only on the levels of subsidies, but also on the 
distribution of involvment across markets. The latter information is excluded by the PSE 
measure. And, information on the distribution of subsidies is as important as the total 
level of subsisides since each market has a unique set of supply and demand elasticites 
that will affect the amount of subsisidy actually recieved by the producer ( and hence the 
sum of the effects will be less than the PSE). The basic problem is to design an 
instrument or tool that can include the market effects, and to develop such a tool as can 
be easily used across countries. This has been of great interest in the international trade 
arena, especially when trade negotiators and policy makers are faced with the task of 
arguing about reducing or mqdifying the levels of protection and support so as to obtain 
"a level playing field". 
The inclusion of domestic policies in trade negotiations; both at the bilateral 
(North American Free Trade Agreement) and the multilateral level (World Trade 
Organization), has increased the need for the development of measures that separates 
the level of expenditures on subsisides and the actual level of support provided. Such 
measures are necessary to compare the actual levels of protection or support for 
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agriculture producers and to monitor reduction in this support through bilateral1 and 
multilateral2 agreements. Indeed, such measures are also useful at the national level 
during debates on budget reductions. 
Policy Indicators for Agriculture 
Josling (1993) defines policy indicator as a number that can be used to convey 
information about the level, impact, or effectiveness of a policy instrument or set of 
policies. To be useful, a policy measure should be comparable over time, across 
commodities, across policies, and across countries; easily understood and interpreted; 
non controversial; easily measured and replicable; and reasonably accurate. 3 
Types of indicators 
Several indicators have been developed to reveal information about the level of 
government support . Among the different types of indicators, special attention has been 
given to the Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS). The aggregate measure concept 
focuses on measuring the extent, structure and development of agricultural protection 
in the world (Tangermann et al, 1987; Schwartz and Parker, 1988; Hertel, 1989; Josling 
and Tangermann, 1989; Peters, 1989). In this category, the most widely used measures 
include the nominal rate of protection (NRP), the effective rate of protection (ERP) and 
the Producer/Consumer subsidy equivalent (PSE). 
1The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement incorporated a relative measure of the level of support 
to implement the provision that eliminates Canadian Import licenses from Wheat, Oats and Barley. 
(USGAO, 1991) 
2 Under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GAIT), OECD was directed to 
find an indicator to monitor the agreement on the proposed reduction in the level of Agricultural support. 
Article 6, paragraph 4(a) Part IV of the Agreement on Agriculture. 
3 As Josling (1993) indicates, if an indicator is not comparable across commodities, time or countries, little 
information for the policy maker, even if it is simple to understand, noncontroversial, and easy to calculate. 
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Nominal Rate of Protection: 
Defined as the domestic price relative to an appropriate international price 
(Tsakok, 1990), the nominal rate ofprotection provides a relative measure of trade 
distortion. Thus 
where pb is the' border price of commodity i ( e.g. the foreign price times the 
exchange rate), and Pdi is the domestic price of commodity i. 
This indicator is easy to use·and understand, but it suffers from interpretation 
problems in situations of world price instability. Another limitation is thatit only 
estimates the effects of protective measures placed. on outputs; The estimate leaves out 
the effects of protection on domestic resource allocation (Henneberry and Henneberry, 
1989). 
Effective Rate of Protection: 
As a reaction to the limitation of the NRP, the ERP includes the value of inputs. 
The ERP attempts to capture the production incentives of input and output subsidies ( as 
a percentage of free trade. value added). Since the input market is considered, ERP is 
potentially a more encompassing assessment of the protective structure of intervention. 
The formula of the ERP is 
where pb is the border price of commodity i ( e.g. the foreign price times the 
8 
exchange rate), and Pdi is the domestic price of commodity i, 8i; is the units of input j per 
unit of output i, pdj is the domestic price of input j and phj is the foreign price of input j, 
and pdjis domestic price ofinputj. The major problem with this indicator is the 
complexity of the data required for its estimation. Its calculation requires estimates of 
prices and input-output coefficients in the hypothetical situation of free trade (Strak, 
1982). 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent 
The Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) was developed in the 1970s by the 
agricultural economist Timothy Josling for the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) (FAO, 1973) as a general measure of agrarian support. The PSE is an equivalent-
type indicator that relies on the comparability and comprehension of the instrument 
chosen as a proxy (Josling, 1993 ; Dixit and Roningen, 1989). 
The concept became widely known in the 1980s when the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD) began using it to implement the 
extent of government support for a range of commodities across all OECD countries4 
(Harley, 1996). At the same time, the United States Department of Agriculture started 
working extensively on the concept as well. The PSE was seen as an indicator that 
translated all policies that assist producers and consumers in the agricultural sector, into 
an equivalent level of another policy or value. 
For the U.S. technical negotiating team, the PSE was the kind of quantitative 
4 Josling developed the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) approach to examine the support implied by government 
intervention in agriculture.(Josling,1981). The OECD developed the methodology and applied progressively to all OECD 
countries. PSEs were first estimated by the OECD in the context of the 1982 Ministerial Trade Mandate and 
subsequently as the most important element in the annual monitoring of developments in Member countries in the 
context of the 1987 OECD Ministerial Principles for Agricultural Reform. 
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information that trade negotiators needed on the trade and agriculture policies of other 
countries (USDA, 1987). 
The PSE Concept. 
The Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) is defined by the OECD (Cahill, 1990) 
as an indicator of the total value of the monetary transfers to agricultural producers 
resulting from agricultural policies in a given year. The PSE is used to evaluate the size 
of income transfers resulting from government policies. 
In the PSE calculations, both transfers from consumers of agricultural products 
(through domestic prices), and transfers from taxpayers (through budgetary or tax 
expenditures) are included. (OECD, 1987).. In practice, PSEs for individual countries are 
rarely all-inclusive, because some transfers such as transfers associated with the 
underpricing of irrigation water or tax concessions, are often omitted due to a lack of 
data. 
The Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (CSE) is an indicator of the value of 
monetary transfers to consumers resulting from agricultural policies in a given year. It 
comprises both transfer to, or more commonly from, domestic consumers due to market 
price support policies and transfers from taxpayers to consymers of agricultural products 
(OECD,1987). Normally, the first type of transfers are larger in absolute terms than the 
second (and carry a negative sign). As a result, the CSE measure assumes that any 
market price support given to producers is paid by an implicit tax on the consumer 
through higher food prices. 
These two measures account for the usual budget outlays of the government 
intervention in the sector, but also include policies that do not result in specific budget 
10 
outlays such as tariffs, import quotas and permits, and variable levies. 5 
PSE coverage 
The OECD applies a broader measure for the PSE than that used by the F AO in 
the early stages of the indicator's development. The FAQ limited itself to product-
specific policy measures and paid no attention to structural policy measures such as 
training, technical asistance and research. (Josling and Tagermann, 1989). In contrast 
the OECD has included in its calculations all agricultural policy measures that affect 
agricultural production, consumption and trade. 
The OECD distinguishes five types of agricultural policies associated with the 
method of monetary transfer. 
Table 2. Policies included in PSE calculations 
Method of transfer Subsidy 
Measures that simultaneously affect producer and consumer e.g. Market Price Support 
prices 
Measures that transfer money directly from taxpayers to e.g. Direct Payments 
producers without raising prices to consumers 
Measures that lower input cost, with no distinction made e.g. Reduction to input costs 
between subsidies to capital and those to other inputs 
Measures that in the long term reduce cost hut which are not e.g. General Services 
directly received by producers. 
Other indirect support, the main elements of which are Other Indirect Support. 
subnational subsidies and tax concessions. 
They include: market price support, direct payments, input subsidies, general 
services, and another indirect support measures (Shelby, 1994). In the case of market 
4These policies force consumer to pay prices higher than those prevailing in the world market. Therefore, 
consumers bear the cost of these policies that benefit producers through an indirect tax that never shows in 
government budgets. 
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price support, income transfers occur because the domestic market price differs from the 
price at the border (world market price). In the OECD countries, the domestic price is 
usually higher, and thus creates a transfer to producers. The scale of a specific transfer is 
measured by multiplying the relevant price difference by the domestic volume of 
production. How this affects the governments budget is only an issue in so far as a 
difference exists between domestic production and consumption. Disregarding inventory 
fluctuations, this difference corresponds with international trade. The budget benefits 
from taxes on imports and is burdened by subsidies for exports. Transfers to producers 
by means of the other government programs are paid entirely, from the budget. 
PSE calculation 
The PSE, as measured by the OECD, is expressed in three ways6 : 
1. as the total value of assistance to the commodity produced; (Total 
PSE), 
2. as the total value of assistance per unit of the commodity 
produced; (Unit PSE), 
3. as the ratio of the total value of assistance to total receipts, which 
is value of production, including any direct net receipts. 
In algebraic form, these PSE expressions are written as: 
Net Total PSE = Q * (P - PWnc) + DP - LV + OS - FA 
6 Another way PSE are expressed is through the Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC).The NAC provides a 
measure of comparison of the relationship between domestic and world market prices. The conversion of 
PSE into NAC is based on the assumption that all government policies per unit of transfer contribute in the 
same way to the price differences. This assumption stands for market price support and deficiency payment 
policies as long as no restriction are attached to the policy, but for other policies does not apply as easy 
(OECD,1991). 
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Gross Total PSE 
Unit PSE = 
= Q * (P - PWnc) + DP - LV + OS 
Q * (P - PWnc) + DP - LV + OS - FA 
Q 
Percentage PSE = lOO * (Q * (P - PWnc) + DP - LV + OS - FA) 
Q * P + DP - LV) 
where Qis the volume of production, Pis the domestic production price, PWnc is 
the world price (reference price) at the .border in domestic currency, DP is the value of · 
direct payments, L V is .the value of levies on production, and OS refers to all other 
budgetary-financed support; FA refers to the feed adjustment ( only for livestock 
products). 
The OECD also conputes a Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (CSE) that includes 
two categories of agricultural policies. 
Table 3. Policies included in CSE calculations 
Method of trans/er Subsidy 
Transfers Consumers to l'roducers due to market price support . e.g. Market Transfers 
Budgetary transfers to consumers resulting from agricultural e.g. Other Transfers 
policies 
Like the PSE, the CSE as measured by the OECD is expressed in three ways: 
1. as the total value of assistance to the commodity consumed; 
(Total PSE), 
2. as the total value of assistance per unit of the commodity 
consumed; (Unit PSE), 
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3. as the ratio of the total value of assistance to total receipts, which 
is value of consumption, including any direct consumption 
subsidies. 
In algebraic form, the CSE is calculated as follows: 
Total CSE 
Unit CSE= 
Percentage CSE = 
= Qc * (Pc - PWnc) + OT 
QC * (Pc -PWnc) + or· 
QC 
(Qc * (Pc - PWnc) + 01) 
100 * 
(Qc * P) 
where Qc is the volume of consumption, Pc is the domestic consumption price, 
PWnc is the world price (reference price) at the border in domestic currency, OT is the 
value of budgetary subsidies to consumers resulting from agricultural policies. 
The OECD calculates and monitors the levels of PSE and CSE for all member 
countries. Each policy has a corresponding monetary value,· making possible a cross 
country comparison as the level of assistance represented by different policy instruments 
changes. Expressing the values in percentage form simplifies .the comparison of the 
relative support levels over time and between products. and countries.. If examined 
across countries, the PSE and CSE indicate the relative importance of government.policy 
in different countries and commodity markets in terms of the contribution of the policy 
to farmer revenues and consumer costs .. When examined over time, the PSE.and CSE 
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show changing government involvement in the agricultural sector. 
The PSE for a particular commodity is positive when the net effect of all 
programs affecting the commodity in a country is to increase the income of producers 
over the level of income that would be received in the absence of these programs. The 
PSE will have a negative value if the net effect of all programs-reduces farm income. 
Likewise, the CSE is negative when the net effect of the programs increases the price 
that consumers pay for food and positive when consumers pay less for food than-the 
world market price. 
There is a dosed relationship between PSE and CSE. Market price support 
. . 
policies that create a wedge between domestic and world prices raise consumer price. A . 
positive(negative) transfer from consumers to producers - a subsidy (tax) to producers:--
is equivalent to a tax (subsidy) on consumption. (OECD, 1987). Specific consumer 
subsidies paid from government budget$, such as food subsidies, may partly offset such 
taxes on consumption. Direct payments and other budgetary support paid to producers, 
raise the effective price received by producers but do not raise the price paid by 
consumers. 
· Analysis of the United States Agricultural Support for 1979-1996 
United States agricultural producer support levels (aggregated for all 
commodities) as measured by the PSE varied widely during the period from 1979-1996 
(table 1), with the peak subsidyyears in the mid eighties (1986-1987). Following a 
similar pattern, the CSE also varied widely during the same period (table 1.b). However, 
the average implicit tax was always lower than the average level of support to producers. 
Measured as the percent of gross agricultural receipts (Percentage PSE), total 
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transfers to all producers tripled between 1979 and 1986 (Figure 1 ). The average level of 
transfers during the 18 year period was $24.5 billion per year. While the PSE tripled the 
negative CSE less than doubled. (Figure 2). The average implicit tax to consumers as 
result of government policies peaked irt 1986 at nearly $14 biUion. 
The pattern of support reflects the mid-1980's and early 1990's drop in world 
market prices. The PSE calculation reflects an inverse relationship between world price 
and the.level of transfers to the producer. The most important government programs 
inversely link the level of support received to world market price levels. · This inverse 
relationship is easily seen in the case of wheat. A simple statistical model is derived in 
which a linear relationship between the level of transfer and world price of wheat is 
formulated The equation assumes that the level of total producer subsidy·equivalent 
(total transfer) is an inverse function of the (world) price of the commodity and is 
written as: 
PSEwheat = a0 - P1 (Price) + € 
where a0 is the intercept , p1 represents the amounuhat the PSE will decrease 
from a one dollar increase in world price and e is a random and normally distributed 




-54.04599 * Wheat-Price 
(11.07512) 
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R2 = o.n33888 
F= 23.8139 
-....J 
Table 3. Producer subsidy Equivalent for the United States. 1979-1976 
Detall or general pollcy fflNIUr .. : Units/ 
Adju,ted wlue or production 
A. Market price ,upport 
B.L"'i .. 
C. Direct paymenll 
Deficiency po)1n0!115 





Loon deficiency po)1n0!11A 
Marlo::tm& loons 
PFCpo)1n0!1ts 









Reoearch, advi>ory, trainin& 
Inopection 
Pest and di,euc control 
Struct""'8/infraotructures 
Marlo::tin& and promotion 
F. Sub natlonal 
G. Other 
Total other 1upport (D+E+F+G) 
Gron Iola! PSE 
X. Feed adju,tment 




































1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1,991 1,992 1,993 1,994 1,995 1,996 
107,045 110,733 111,585 112,377 112,084 111,738 109,198 105,937 112,182 110,000 118,647 123,585 118,494 124,397 122,263 130,724 130,7116 145,2(,() 
8,115 8,626 8,'709 9,833 10,772 11,762 14,321 15,432 15,900 9,893 9,963 14,143 12,628 12,673 14,143 12,664 8,214 11,125 
0 0 0 0 ~7 ~ -US -510 -265 -36 0 -8 -SO -141 -161 -222 -196 0 
608 1,175 1,964 2,049 12,360 4,767 6,946 14,313 12,923 8,071 6,091 6,961 5,478 6,657 6,285 6,017 1,587 4,591 
94 38 716 1,171 1,119 3,330 4,740 10,806 10,418 4,240 4,969 6,417 5,096 6,015 4,277 5,271 1,516 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
109 611 348 16 I O O O O 2,825 887 135 283 312 1,757 596 5 0 
134 308 508 0 10,748 1,171 1,376 362 1,(00 622 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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339 340 351 374 
246 179 221 228 
430 393 429 450 
78 58 80 71 
1,162 1,195 1,225 1,344 
1,224 963 1,002 ,915 
7,439 7,564 7,434 7, 784 
19,321 311,039 23,301 28,887 
0 0 0 41 
19,321 30,039 23,301 28,845 




































































































7,466 7,384 7,478 7,189 
36,083 25,311 23,532 28,286 
-384 -78 -45 -168 
35,699 25,233 23,488 28,117 






















































































































1,414 1,414 1,516 
118 131 122 
1,8'4 1,918 1,940 
3Sl 386 395 
7,113 7~ 7,798 
25,573 17,406 23,513 
-361 -26 0 
25,213 17,380 23,513 
19 13 16 
Nd to(l!l 1'SE cuss ma> PSS ma 14335 IS 649 iZ 015 19 321 3P ll39 P W 28, /US J6tf64 35. 692 25 2U P '8{I 28.117 U IU1 24 QS2 lZ 657 25 2U LPM/ 21 513 
Source: OECD, 1997 
Table 4 Consumer Subsidi Eguivalent for United States. 1979-1996 
Detail or general policy m.,..u...,. : Units/ 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1,991 1,992 1,993 1,994 1,995 1,996 
oonsumptlon Unites (e) (p) 
Value of consumption '0001 90,492 94,038 88,377 90,715 93,826 92,443 86,209 84,013 91,597 97,295 100,749 105,938 104,187 102,921 109,420 108,134 113,834 120,524 
A. Market transfers '0001 ·9,211 -8,419 -8,354 ·10,010 -11,024 -12,589 -14,661 -15,553 -14,866 -9,213 -9,410 -13,074 -11,525 -11,429 -12,873 -11,571 ·8,117 -11,300 
B. Other transfers '0001 480 707 826 834 1,757 1,904 1,753 1,622 1,642 1,358 928 711 700 705 885 802 802 782 
C.TotalCSE '0001 -8,731 -7,70 -7,513 -9,176 -9,267 -10,685 -12,908 -J:J,931 -J:J,224 -7,855 -8,482 -12,31a -10,825 -10,724 -11,989 -10,769 -7,315 -10,518 
D. Percentage CSE % -10 -8 -9 -10 -10 -12 -15 -17 -14 -8 -8 -12 ·10 -10 -11 -10 ~ -9 
Z:flllll. ~Ii. £1Z!i.t 111111 Utilma :£ ZU ·Z ZU ·Z .W -2m: ·2 2Q: ·ll! 1W ·LHtl6. ·U &U ·U 2U ·Z £ii :41111. ·l2 ~ ·lf.l 4U ·LI! ZU ·ll 262 ·LI! Zti2 ·Z,m ·ltUl6. 
Source: OECD, 1997 
Table 5. Shares of General Polici Measures in net total PSE/CSE 
Unim/ 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1,991 1,992 1,993 1,994 1,995 
A. Market price support net of % 61 55 51 51 34 48 49 40 43 39 42 50 49 47 49 48 46 
-00 
C. Direct paymen!B % 4 8 12 11 41 20 24 39 36 32 26 25 22 26 23 24 9 
D. Reduction of input cos!B % 8 10 12 16 12 14 12 9 10 13 10 7 6 5 7 4 10 
E. General services % 12 12 11 10 6 8 7 5 6 9 12 11 13 13 13 15 22 
F. Sub national % 9 8 7 6 4 5 5 4 4 6 7 7 7 7 7 8 11 
G. Other 7 7 7 6 3 4 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
TOTAL OF PSE ELEMENTS 101 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
A. Market transfers % 105 109 111 109 119 118 114 112 112 117 111 106 106 107 107 107 111 
B. Other transfers % -5 -9 -11 -9 -19 -18 -14 -12 -12 -17 -11 -6 -6 -7 -7 -7 -11 
lQl-dL. QE. ~~t; il&M~tiI~ lQQ lQQ lQQ lQO lOQ lQQ lQQ lQO 100 lQQ lQQ lOQ lQQ 100 lQQ lQQ lQQ 
Source: OECD, 1997 
Figure 1. U.S. Producer Subsidy Equivalents 1979-1996 
45000 
40000 
U.S. Producer Subsidy Equivalent 
1979-1996 
35% 32% 
!! 35000 .. 
30000 is 
·. 27"' 26% - 7 
Average t24.6bUllons j~~"'-J-II-} 23% 23% 23% 20% .,,, 21% 21% """" 19% 16% ... 25000 
'o 20000 .. 
C 15000 ~:, 
10000 ii 5000 
0 
OOJ 'i ;;· :: 1-r~--13% .. I . . 
More than 70% of the variation in the PSE for wheat is explained by the price of 
. . 
wheat (dollars per ton). Further, for each dollar that wheat price increases.PSE will 
decrease by $54.04 million. 
During the peak years of support, the level of transfers to producers increased at 
about double the level of support provided in the in the late 1970s. 
Policy Approach· 
Total PSE gives valuable information on Jhe level of support. The different 
components of the PSE offers data on the different types of policies used by the 
government to transfer.support to the producers or consumers. 
The United States relied heavily on market price support and direct payments to 
transfer income to producers (Figure 3). Market price support indicates the amount of 
transfer that is accomplished through price intervention in the market. Direct payments 
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indicates the amount of transfer that is accomplished through direct income transfers 
(Nelson, 1995).7 
Major price intervention policies were export subsidy programs, import quotas 
and tariffs. These programs represented between 45-50% of total transfers over the last 
18 years (Figure 3). Price intervention average $11.646 billions per year during 1979-
1996 or 10% of the gross aggregated value of agricultural production. The most 
important U.S. price intervention came from domestic program for dairy and sugar, 
supplemented by import restrictions. Guaranteed minimum prices were provided by 
government loan rates for sugarcane and sugar beets, and by government purchase prices 
Figure 2. US Consumer Subsidy Equivalents 1979-1996 
for dairy products. 




~:: I I I II ~· -
7Trade policies often increased ( or decreased) the level of domestic market prices relative to world market 
prices. Price intervention is based on the difference between the relative world price and the domestic price. 
(OECD, 1997) 
20 
Figure 3. Share of Major Policies on Total Aggregated PSE Transfers. 1979-1996 
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Figure 5. Income Support and Price Intervention Policies share relationship over 
1979-1996 
Policy Share relatlonshlp at NaUonal Level 
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The various types of U.S. direct payment programs are listed in Table 1. 
Deficiency payments are by far the largest source of direct income transfers. The level of 
direct payments and the producer subsidy share of these payments increased steadily 
until 1986 and then steadily declined. These payments were made primarily to the feed 
and food grain crops. 
Input subsidies have represented an average of 5-10% of total transfer. It 
amounted to $2.337 billion or 2% of total production value during the period from 1979 
to 1996. Credit subsidies represented 85% oftheinput subsidy which was transfered 
through real state, operating and other farm loans. 
General Service policies related to marketing assistance, public research, 
development of public infrastructure, and the various inspection and pest control 
programs. These programs accounted for an average 5-15% share of total transfers. 
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On average, they have been used to transfer $2.599 billion (2% of average total 
production value) per year during 1979-1996. 
The method of transfer will also offer information on the distribution of program 
cost across the groups in the economy. Taxpayers pay for transfers that do not directly 
affect agricultural commodity market prices. Consumers pay for price intervention 
transfers, unless the increase in price is offset by direct government transfer to 
consumers. 
Following these transfer rules, the trend in the distribution of progduer subsidies 
can be shown in the mix of policies used (Figure 3 and 4). 
Figure 6. Marketing Assistance and Input Reduction Cost Policies share 








Share relationship of policies at national level 
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First, it should be noted that income support policies are triggered when 
domestic commodity prices are below target prices and price intervention policies are 
trigger when world price falls below domestic prices. 
Policy approaches by sector: 
Support levels and trend look very different when they are analyzed at the sector 
level. In addition, PSE patterns changed from one sector to another. The following 
analysis focus on the aggregate calculation of the PSE for the crop sector (wheat, com, 
sorghum, rice, soybean and sugar) and the livestock sector ( diary, beef, pork, poultry, 
sheep and eggs). 
Crop PSE patterns reflect the mid- l 980's and early l 990's drop in world prices. 
Transfers to the crop sector average $10. 778 billion during the period of 1979-1986 
implementation of the Food Security Act of 1985)8 and 1987. The last 10 years show a 
decreasing trend in the level of support. Support is declining faster in the crop sector 
than in the livestock sector.(Figure 7). 
Transfers to the livestock sector average $13.599 billion per year during the 
period of 1979 to 1996. Different from that of the crop sector, PSE levels are not as 
volatile in the livestock sector. Although reaching peak levels between 1985-1987 as 
well. 
This trend is reversed when CSE calculations are observed for the each sector. 
8 Under the 1985 Act, US commodity loan rates were decreased and the Export Enhancement Program was 
started. (Nelson, 1995) With the price slump and program changes, U.S. support payments and market price 
transfers increased in 1986-1987. 
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Since livestock programs depended more on price intervention (diary program), more 
volatility and implicit tax can be observed for the consumer of the.livestock sector than 
for the consumer of the crop sector. (Figure 10) This indicates the importance of the 
policy mix. 
The policy mix in the crop sector indicates how the government is distributing the 
cost of the programs across groups in the economy. The crop sector support relied 
more on income support policies (Figure 11). From 1979 to 1996, an average of 48% of 
the support to the, sector was in the form· of income support policies, equivalent to 
$3.870 billion. Price intervention accounted for an average of 12% of total transfer or 
$1.355 billion to the sector. In fact, policies directed to input cost reduction and 
marketing assistance represented even a bigger share than that of price intervention 
policies, accounting for 16% or $1.528 billion average per year and 14% or $1.361 
billion per year respectively. Evidently, the government relied more on taxpayer money 
to afford commodity programs. 
The policy mix in the livestock sector shows a complete different pattern and 
distribution of cost programs. This sector support relied heavily on price intervention 
(Figure 12). Thistype qfpolicy accounted for 75% of average transfer during 1979-
1996. This is equivalent to $10.282 billions per year. Income support policies 
. . 
accounted only for 1% of average total transfer. An average of98.0 millions were 
transferred using this kind of policy. Marketing assistance policies· represented an 
average of 9% or $1.286 billions during the period of 1979-1986 while input reduction 
policies accounted for 6% or 808.0 millions of total transfer during the same period. It 
should be noted that policies dealing with the reduction of input cost were concentrated 
25 
in subsidies to interest 
Figure 7. PSE Trends in the Livestock and Crop Sector. 1979-1996 
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rates, in the form market loans. In the other hand, market assistance policies 
devoted more than 50% of this support on research for the sector. In the livestock 
sector, consumer were in charge of paying for the type of support the government was 
supplying to the sector. 
Limitation of the Producer Subsidy Equivalent 
After the 1987 OECD Summary reporttrade analysts begin to question whether 
the PSE could be considered an adequate measure of trade distortion caused by 
governmental agricultural policies. Extended analysis of the measure concluded that this 
is not the case. {Hamsvoort & Silvis, 1996). 
As indicated before, the PSE provides a convenient way to monitor agricultural 
support levels over time and facilitates country and commodity comparisons by showing 
the total value of expeditures. In addition, the indicator can highlight commodity and 
country differences in agricultural support levels that can encourage excess production 
and distort prices and trade (Nelson, Simone and Valdez, 1995). 
However, the PSE does not measure the effects of policies on production, 
consumption or world prices. The PSE is a measure of the apparent support to 
producers, not of trade, price or income distortion. The different policies covered in the 
PSE have different and unique implications for production and trade, but these 
implications are not measured by this indicator (Ballenger,N 1988; Cahill, C and Legg, 
W, 1990; Schwartz, N.E. and Parker, S., 1988). 
The PSE and CSE measures can not directly reveal the unique effects on 
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production, consumption, trade, and prices of a changing level or the mix of government 
intervention in agricultural markets. The measures are simple sums of the various levels 
of monetary support provided to either producers or consumers by each policy. Because 
of the inelastic nature of the supply and demand for agricultural commodities, the level of 
public support which actually becomes part of net farm income will not necessarily be 
equal to the total level of support. The actual level of support received by the producer 
or consumer depends on the policy instrument and supply and demand elasticities. Using 
PSE as indicator of trade distortions can be misleading when countries pursue policies 
that offset trade-distortion effects of producer support.(Roningen and Dixit, 1991). 
The PSE does contain information that can be used to derive measures of the 
effects of support policies on trade and to determine the transfer of income to producers 
net oflosses in the market. Since different policies may have very different effects on 
production and exports, the policy composition of the PSE is important in assessing the 
potential implications of a country's policies. 
The Trade Distorted by Support (TDS) coefficient developed by Roningen and 
Dixit, (1991} is an example of using the PSE information to derived better indicators. 
This indicator was derived from the information in the PSE and designed to measure 
changes in volume of net trade :from existing levels if a country completely eliminates all 
support to the commodity. 
where for each commodity i, e1 and edn are own -price supply and demand 
elasticities, qs and qd are observed production and consumption quantities, sm is the 
29 
market support ratio, sP and scare direct (income) support rates for producers and 
consumers, si is the support ratio for all other types of assistance to producers, and sso 
is the set-aside offset, usually resulting from direct payments to producers. Roningen 
calculated TDS for 13-commodities and 1 lcountries using the PSE data set (OECD, 
1990) 
This instrument, as others, did not consider the composition or the mix of 
policies transferring the support , changes in world prices that result from the removal of · 
policies were ignored, and cross-commodity effects of policy elimination were not. 
included. 
Aggregate Measures of Support and GATT 
During the Uruguay Round ofGATT, negotiations on agricultural trade 
highlighted the interest of most governments in support measurement. In fact, at the 
beginning of the negotiations· in 1986, the parties expressed their intent to develop an 
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) which could bring the wide range of existing 
agricultural support policies under a common measure by which a level playing field 
could be defined. The new concept was to be used not only for monitoring purposes, 
but also for making binding commitments. Due to this interest, the AMS was regarded 
as the central plan on which a new agreement could be based. However, in the final 
GATT agreement signed in 1996, the AMS only appeared as one ofa number of 
elements, not the key element. 
The concept of an AMS, developed after roughly 10 years of negotiations, was 
the Producer Subsidy Equivalent indicator. The negotiation records indicate that "this 
choice was a practical one, based on availability and measurability "(Hamsvoort & Silvis, 
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1996). 
The WTO's AMS is a more narrowly defined aggregate measure of assistance. 
Its main goal is to facilitate multilateral reductions in domestic support. During the 
Uruguay round the main commitments from the countries were: 
1) Establish a base AMS measure for 1986-1988 
2) give credit for reductions since 1986 
3) Aggregate all disciplin,e policies into one AMS 
4) Provide criteria for non-disciplined policies 
5) Establish AMS ceilings 20% below the 1986-1988 base. 
The WTO classified US Agricultural policies according to the fact that some 
were direct agricultural policies and some were not. 
Table 6. 
Agricultural Policies - Trade Distorting domestic Policies (AMS). 
-Non-Trade distorting domestic policies "green") 
- Trade (non-domestic) policies 
Non Agricultural Policies (non disciplined) - Forestry/recreation 
- rural development/housing 
- USDA administrative activities 
All trade distorting domestic policies were aggregated into one total WTO AMS 
that defines and quantifies a base level of support for each country for the 1986-1988 
base period. The measure must be updated every year until 2000 and the WTO has to be 
notified ofthis update. 
This notification is used by the organization to monitor the development of 
agricultural support levels of each country and encourage the countries to keep their 
support levels no larger than the agreed-to ceiling levels. 9 
9 " ... a member is in compliance with support reduction commitments [if] its ... Current total AMS does not 
exceed the ... :final bound commitment level ... " (Part IV, Article 6) Agreement on Agriculture. 
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Conclusions 
Subsidies and the policies that promote may encourage practices that are 
economically perverse, trade distorting and ecologically destructive. In most cases, 
governments do not intentionally impose policies forthese purposes. However, most 
policies have impacts other than those for which they were intended. The key issue is to 
what extent policies are actually serving their original purpose and to measure any 
adverse consequences they may have on markets or the entities involved in the market. 
Agricultural policy goals and the tools used to obtain those goals differ across 
countries and commodities. For example, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and 
Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996, accelerates the trend set in the two previous major farm 
acts toward greater market orientation that have gradually reduced the government's 
involvement in U.S. agricultural markets and even more importantly has reduced the the 
impact of this involvment on trade. The reduction in government involvement has been 
achieved through a change in both the level of support and the mix of policy tools. 
The FAIR act eliminated subsidies tied to production and instead provides direct 
payments, increasing farmers available planting decisions, allows unrestricted haying and 
grazing, eliminates acreage reduction programs, reduces government involvement in the 
management of stocks ( by reducing the price support loan levels and the FOR entry 
levels), and eliminates multi peril mandatory crop insurance. 
Before the FAIR Act, US agricultural policy goals included price and income 
protection and income enhancement for farmers and assurance of adequate supplies of 
food and fibers for consumers at reasonable prices. Goals growing in importance in the 
eighties included conservation, protection of cropland, and competitiveness in world 
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markets. 
The income support paid to U.S. farmers prior to the FAIR Act was tied to 
production of specific commodities. This transfer directly impacted the consumers and 
producers in the market for that commodity . .The new direct payment does not affect 
any specific market but may affect many agricultural and nonagricultural markets 
depending upon the associated expenditure patterns of the farmers. Thus, even if the 
same level of support is provided with the direct payment as was provided with the 
previous income support program the market distortion that is created will vary 
considera_bly between the two policies. 
A change in the mix of support provided to agriculture through a change in the 
-
level of the components of PSE will have implications on output and income different 
from those on exports, land values and employment. These differences can be 
systematically related to the instruments used to support agriculture and the mix that is 
recorded in PSE information.(Hertel, 1989). 
The changing level of support applied across the mix of policy tools will result in 
different direct impacts on consumption, production and income and will also affect the 
distribution of program cost among different .groups in the economy (e.g. consumer or 
taxpayer). For example, since taxpayers pay for transfers that do not directly affect 
agricultural commodity market prices and'consumer pay for price intervention transfers, 
a reallocation of experiditures between market price supports or direct· payments will 
have a different impact on consumers and taxpayers. Additionally, any change in the mix 
of support instruments will have a different impact on th.e induced effects of the policies 
on trade, employment, input use and the environment. 
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Presenting the formula used to calculate the unit PSE it can be shown that the 
PSE can be maintained at constant levels but countries can choose a mix of policies that 
will be less or more trade distorting or that will have less effect on employment or 
income. Changing instruments from indirect programs to. direct payment programs can 
lower the distorting effects of just maintaining some policies at constant level of total 
support. 
Unit PSE = 
Q * (P - PWnc) + DP - LV + OS - FA 
Q 
There is an enormous significance of analyzing the effects of the composition of 
support and its side effects. And it goes beyond the basic information of the indicator on 
the level of support given to a further multidimensional fashion that can inform about the 
policy choices effects in a more reliable way. 
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A Policy Evaluation Methodology 
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A Policy Evaluation Methodology 
·. Abstract 
A Policy Evaluation Methodology (PEM} is d·eveloped to measure the impacts 
on trade of domestic agricultural policies. The PEM considers the price transmission 
between agricultural input, production and output markets to estimate the distribution of 
the price and income support policie·s between producers and consumers. An index is . . . . . 
generated which. enables an across c~untry and commodity comparison of the portion of 
the total government outlays received by the producers and the associated degreetrade 
distortion. 
Key words: trade distortions, commodity programs 
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A Policy Evaluation Methodology 
Introduction 
More than a decade ago, the OECD Secretariat and the Economic Research 
Service initiated the measurement of producer and consumer subsidy equivalents 
(PSE/CSE), and the analysis of the trade impacts of policies through various modeling 
exercises (OECD, 1984; Roningen and Dixit, 1988). These modeling exercises used the 
PSEs/CSEs as aggregated measures of the level of public support provided to 
agriculture. The PSE/CSE measures assumes a $1 dollar transfer to producers for each 
1 dollar of public expenditure. However, several recent studies indicate that policy 
instruments such as market price support, direct payments, and input subsidies have very 
different effects on farm income and trade distortion (OECD, 1996; Liapis, 1990). This 
suggests that accuratelly measure the value of public transfer to agricultural producers 
requires an accounting of the differential impacts of policies. 
A new analytical approach is proposed to address this issue. The methodology 
requires the separation of PSEs/CSEs into sub-categories of policies and the evaluation 
of their individual and aggregated impact in the input and commodity markets using a 
simulation instrument. The simulation. model provides for the presention of impacts of 
the changes in specific policies on several econ9mic indicators which are normalized as 
indexes to permit comparison of the policies on an equal basis. These indexes are 
presented in a matrix form to allow comparison among policies and across commodities. 
The main idea of such methodology is to create a more accurate aggregate 
measure of support for U.S. agriculture. The main goal will be to construct a relatively 
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simple multimarket partial equilibrium model that enables policy makers to better 
understand and compare the multidimensional economic effects of a diverse set of policy 
instruments. This model could be replicated for various others countries, to create a 
simple and common analytical framework that will improve upon the information 
contained in the PSEs/CSEs facilitating future trade negotiations in the agricultural 
sector. This is important in the post-Uruguay Round policy climate where many nations 
are moving away from traditional market price support instruments, to income support 
and other increasingly complex mixes of policy instruments for which aggregate 
measures of support represented solely as output price wedges are less useful. 
This paper describes the theoretical grounds and modeling approach used to 
develop a more accurate measure of aggregate support for U.S. agricultural producers. 
The paper also provides estimates of the effects of disaggregating the PSE components 
and include them in an individual policy analysis. The paper begins with a brief 
description of the simulation framework, followed by a description of the policy regime 
in place in 199 5. The findings of our analysis are presented next, focusing on the policy 
impacts on farm income and trade. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations 
of the analysis and areas for future work. 
Structure10 
The Policy Evaluation methodology (PEM) enables an assessment of the 
impacts of changes in the mix and levels of support in agricultural policies on a range of 
10 Debrew (1996) presented the grounds for this methodology in a paper submitted to the meeting of the OECD working 
parties held in France on June 1996. The working parties agreed that the Secretariat would proceed with the proposed 
extension of the analysis to OECD-wide assessments of trade and welfare effects of farm policy, with first results to be 
reported in January 1997. 
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policy relevant indicators. The methodology traces the impacts· of public support 
policies through the market (both direct and indirect) to determine the share of the 
support that is actually transmitted into different variables as distortion. The PEM 
complements the information derived from the PSE and CSE and can be used with these 
measures to form relative indexes of distortion through time and across countries and 
commodities. 
The methodology realies on the information embedded in the PSEs/CSEs data 
base: This information is used in a positive model based upon the theory of vertical and 
horizontal linkages between markets and the concept that government support in a 
market is inefficient. That is, the non-target groups (producers or consumers) of any 
. policy will receive some benefits from the government support due to the market supply 
and demand elasticities. 
The methodology is designed to allow for policies having the same.direct effect 
on specific economic variables to have different induced effects on other variables such 
as trade, employment and domestic welfare. The PEM uses a two stage estimation 
procedure, The first stage estimates the direct impacts of changes in the various 
components of support described in the PSE on production, consumption,· income and 
any production indicators. The second stage assembles these results into a matrix with 
rows containing the different components of the PSE (ways of supporting or taxing 
farmers) and columns denoting the effects of the various suppQrt components on several 
aggregate welfare variables. 
In the past, simple partial equilibrium models have been preferred in the 
economic literature for measuring the inputs of agricultural policies on agricultural 
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markets. Because alternative policies are typically proposals that have not been tried, it 
is often necessary to make conjectures about counter factual situations on little direct 
evidence. Braverman (1987) and Gardner (1987) considered that the best way to make 
conjectures is with a simulation model of some kind. 11 
Therefore, a simulation model is used to estimate the coefficients that capture the 
impacts of different policies in the input and commodity markets. These coefficients will 
enable the construction of different indexes reflecting overall effects of the levels of 
support of the government in the sector 
Simulation Model Development 
Questions can be raised about the type of simulation model that is most helpful in 
analyzing interventions in the agricultural markets. Braverman has done extensive 
research on this area and indicates that among the different approaches, single market, 
supply-demand analysis, multi market supply-demand models and mathematical 
programming and computable general equilibrium model are the most famous and widely 
used. The use of the supply-demand model allows for an extention of the empirical work 
modeling different types of intervention and the resulting gains and losses, but it has 
limitations when dealing with interventions in one or more closely related product 
markets. Larger multi market models incorporate nonagricultural sectors which is 
helpful, but sometimes their complexity makes the incorporation of institutional detail 
much more difficult. For the most part, supply -demand models are the preferred model 
11This forces the analyst to be systematic about inferences and conjectures made, explicit about facts used and 
assumptions maintained, and lead to the quantitative statement of the results. 
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of the agricultural sector for this kind of analysis. 
For example, a single -output two input model developed by Hicks {1932) to 
investigate policy and wage issues in labor economics was applied by Floyd (1965) in 
the agricultural sector to study the effects of farm· price support on the returns to land 
and labor. This model analyzed the agricultural sector as a single sector and did not 
include other market inputs. Muth (1965) used a comparative static model assuming 
linearly homogenous production, competitive ·markets and constant input supply and 
output demand elasticities to derive the demand for prqductive factors and the industry 
supply curve. His model considered one market for output and no trade, very similar to 
. . 
the model .used by Floyd but did not cover the issue of government support and its 
impacts on production: 
Gardner (1987) adopted Muth's model to empirically explain the effects on 
production and three inputs markets of exogenously changing agricultural policies. This 
model allows the incorporation of government changes in percentage changes, but did 
not included the export sector and did not. allowed for the incorporation of measures of 
support as.explanatory variables. 
. . . 
Retaking Muth' s work, Hertel ( 1988) developed a partial equilibrium single 
country model with limited input market i11teraction to· study the significance of 
agricultural technology and factor mobility in determining the impact of changing 
support policies. In his work a measure of support, very similar to the PSE was 
developed, but no attention was given to any specific policy .. The analysis concluded that 
the impact on output, export, employment, and land values of across the-board-
reductions in farm support will vary systematically across countries, depending on a 
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country's reliance on export, output and input subsidies. Gunter, Jeong and White 
(1996) extended Hertel's work to allow simultaneous changes in .policies or shifts in 
input supplies in many countries at the same time, but again a attention was given to 
specific policies. The model quantified the magnitude and distribution of costs 
associated with the changes in input regulation across countries, 
However, none of these simulation models accounted for the effects of 
. ' . • ' . I 
individual policies and the mix of the policies on the input market or the relationship 
between the input and commodity markets. In addition, .information to create the price 
wedges was vague an~ not uniform across policies. This is a role that PSE should take 
in the new modeling techniques. 
To develop the PEM estimation technique, a positive model of the agricultural 
sector was developed. The modeling approach retakes the partial equilibrium approach 
followed in the economic literature to represent the interaction of demand and supply for 
three aggregated commodities: Feed Grains, Food Grains and Oilseeds. This modeling 
approach allows for the analysis of effect of supporting a single relatively small sector of 
the economy, capturing the impacts within the sector. 
The modeling approach included in the PEM methodology can be identify as an 
intermediate run static multiple-product, deterministic, reduced form, multiple input 
model that represents the crop sector in a given year. The rest of the world is 
represented through exports demand equations. The factor markets are explicitly 
modeled and are endogenously linked with aggregate supply and demand of the 
aggregated commodities. 
Factor markets are assumed to be traded domestically and competitively. 
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Inputs are assumed to be freely mobile, with their prices determined by their opportunity 
cost in non-farm activities. This serves to highlight the importance which factor mobility 
plays in determining the ultimate impact of farm policy. Within the context of the 
present analysis, the PEM is constructed to capture the effects of changing the different 
components of the PSE on the input, output and trade markets, Therefore, in terms of 
the model structure, th~ relationship among inputs and between input and output markets 
are important. These elements in the PEM model rely strongly on the single country 
models ofMuth, (1965), Gardner (1985t and Hertel, ( 1988). 
The support policies are modeled in the form of either ad-valorem subsidy 
equivalents or quantitative restrictions. This approach facilitates qualitative analysis and 
permits a close relationship to be drawn between policy instruments and support levels as 
measured by the PSE in the model. 
In the simulation model, the impacts of support policies are analyzed by 
introducing them into an undistorted economic environment (predetermine equilibrium 
level). The basic model can be modified to simulate the effects of policies and programs 
in two generic ways: either as quantitative restrictions or as changes in the support rates 
in the various markets. Quantitative restrictions on the commodity supplied are 
appropriate for supply managed commodities while programs such as the CRP may be 
represented as a shift in the factor supply functions. The treatment of changes in the 
support rate parallels the. analysis of taxes in Layrad and Walters (1979) and Harberger 
. . . 
(1979), which they described as creating wedges between selling and buying prices. 
Generally, programs that reduce the cost of inputs create a wedge between buyer and 
seller price in the relevant input market. Commodity programs are represented as 
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wedges between the prices received by farmers and those paid by foreign and/or 
domestic buyers. The effects of policy changes in the policies will be assumed to be equal 
and opposite in sign to those resulting from the inverse changes of those particular 
policies. This approach, following Harberger's (1978) classic analysis of the corporate 
income tax, was particularly useful in obtaining qualitative results based on an equal cost 
comparison of different methods of supporting agriculture. 
Theoretical Base for the Simulation component of PEM 
Following previous work of the OECD working group, an easy to replicate 
approach was chosen for the first stages of the model design. The Cobb Douglas 
functional form was selected as a starting point for the project. However, because of 
the limitation of this functional form, a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
production function was chosen. Under these circumstances, two identical simulation 
models with different technology were designed to run parallel experiments. The 
simulation components are referred as Cobb Douglas Framework and CES framework, 
respectively. 
The Cobb Douglas framework 
The first modeling framework begins with the assumed profit function for 3 
aggregated commodities and is described algebraically in equation (1). 
-p Q ~ dinp xd (1) 1t- qi Si - I.Ji p iJ * iJ 
Where 1t represent profits, PQj is the price the producer receives for commodity i, 
Qsi is the quantity produced of commodity i, pd/1P is the price ofinput j used in the 
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production of output i and X/, is the quantity of input j used in the production of output. 
The production function is assumed to be of the form 12: 
(14) Qs, = Y; rr;:; (X;;t1 
Where the quantity of commodity i ( Qs) is a function of the quantity of input j 
O'ij d) required to produced commodity i and a, is the elasticity of production of input j in 
commodity i; and y, the constant for the production function of commodity i. 
Deriving Factor Demands 
From the first order condition of the profit function we can derive the level in 
which input price price equals its value of marginal product. 
(15) 
The level of input needed to maximize profits can also be derived from the first 
order condition of the profit function as; 
(16) 
ndinp 
d (P"ij )-1 Q Xy·· = a .. -- Si 
I) pqi 
This factor demand is related to the elasticity of production and prices. The 
12 When the parameter of substitution of the CES equals zero, the value of elasticity is one, and the CES 
fimction reduces to a neoclassical Cobb Douglas form. This is the most widely applied fimctional form in 
partial equilibrium. This fimctional form captures a smooth substitution among primary factors when its 
elasticity of substitution is one. The relative factor shares are constant, the capital-labor ratio and the wage-
rental ratio rise by the same proportions; thus capital rises exactly the same as labor's share. 
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assumption of a Cobb Douglas production function simplifies the analysis but imposes 
restrictions that can affect the conclusions related to changes in policies affecting the 
input markets. When using an elasticity of substitution of on~, the Cobb Douglas 
production function is representing complementary factors, no substitution among inputs 
is possible and competitive or independent factors are forced to be complements. 
The input demand functions estimated from a Cobb-Douglas production .function 
contain certain "built-in" characteristics .. These characteristics can alter the effects of 
the analysis and they have been described by Chand and Kaul, (1986) as follows: 
1. Own price elasticity of factor demand is always elastic. 
2. All variable factors are complementary to each other . 
3. The effects of a change in any fixed factor is symmetric on all the variable 
inputs inputs. 
4. Cross price elasticity of all factors with respect to the price of any other 
factor is the same in magnitude and sign. 
5. Price elasticity of factor demand with respect to output is always more 
than one. 
The Constant Elasticity of Substitution framework 
Other forms of production functions are 'less restrictive than the Cobb Douglas. 
CES allows for a constant elasticity of substitution for each industry, but different 
elasticity of substitution for different industries. The factor shares of output may also 
vary across industries. The function is linearly homogenous. The total output and total 
cost of the factors are the same if each of the factors is paid its marginal product. Since 
the CES is homogenous and quasi-additive, its factor shares are independent of total 
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output and its elasticity of substitution is the same for all input pairs. In this functional 
form the elasticity of substitution is different from 1, the substitution parameter is 
different from zero. The larger the elasticity of substitution, the flatter the isoquant, and 
the greater the substitutability. However when use in modeling production processes 
with more than two factors, CES suffers the severe limitation that substitution elasticity 
between any pair of factors is equal. Perhaps less serious, CES assumes substitution 
elasticity remains constant as factors vary. The CES production function is defined as; 
(17) 
For i= Food grains, 2.feed grains, 3: oilseeds; andj=l:purchased inputs, 
2.fertilizer, 3:chemicals, 4:hired labor, 5:irrigation, 6:energy, 7:non purchased inputs 
, where Qsiis the output of commodity i, ~is the quantity ofinputj used in the 
production of commodity i indexed over I ;y is the efficiency parameter (Yi > 0), i5 is the· 
distribution parameter of input j from commodity i , p ; is the substitution parameter in 
commodity i (-1 <p) and u is the elasticity of substitution of the inputs in the 
production of commodity i. 
The function is linearly homogenous. The total output and total cost of the 
factors are the same if each of the factors is paid its marginal product. Since the CES is 
homogenous and quasi~additive, its factor shares are inc:iependent of total output and its 
elasticity of substitution is the same for all input pairs. In this functional form the 
elasticity of substitution may be different from 1, if the substitution· parameter is 
different from zero. The larger the elasticity of substitution, the flatter the isoquant, and 
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the greater the substitutability. 
The demand for inputs can be derived both from the profit maximization principle 
or the cost-minimization principle. The profit function is written as: 
(18) MAX II p [~ s. Xd -p, -11p, ~ n..1inp Xd 
i = qi Y; ~j uij ij ] - .t...truij ij 
where Iii is the total profit from the production of output i, Pdnp ii the price the 
producer pays for input j ion the production of commodity i, Pq; is the price producers 
receive for commodity i. This price will be inclusive of any government subsidies or 
taxes. The total demand for factor f in the grain sector (Xdj) equals the aggregation of 
the demand ofinputjuse in food, feed and oilseed production. 
The marginal revenue product of factor j is itself the demand for that particular 
factor under profit maximization because the marginal revenue product is derived from 
the first order condition for maximum profit: 
(19) 
~= p _611 Qs.l+p X.~ -(l+p _ Pd.i.np = O 
,J qi p I I] I] ax11 y, 
Assuming the second-order condition for profit maximization hold, and after 
some mathematical transformation, we obtain the derived demand for factor j. Again, 
the elasticity of substitution has an important role. The elasticity is the slope associated 
with the factor prices. 
The elasticity of substitution (a) is defined as function of the prices of inputs and 
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quantities: 
which, for the CES function, can be simplified using the marginal rate of 
technical substitution equation to: 
(22) a =-1-
1 + p 
In the PEM modeling component, the elasticity of substitution( a) is 
exogenously defined and the substitution parameter ( p) is derived from the value of the 
elasticity using equation 23. The elasticity of substitution is different frorn unity as long 
as the substitution parameter is different from zero. Given the possible values of the 
substitution parameter p(-1< p <00), the elasticity of substitution can vary within a broad 
range: 0 < a< "" . The larger the value of sigma, the flatter the isoquant, and the greater 
is the substitutability. 
PEM Simulation Model Specification 
The simulation method used in PEM can be broadly divided into six components 
including production equations, commodity dem,and equations, factor demand equations, 
factor supply equations, market clearing equations, and price or policy equations. · Each 
component is constrained to the theoretical assumptions noted earlier depending upon 
the production framework. The price equations are used as the instruments for 
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introducing shocks to the model and linking each of the components. 
Production equations 
The production equation is a function of seven inputs. One is an aggregation of 
non-purchased inputs that represents human and physical capital employed in production 
(land and own farm labor) and six purchased inputs (fertilizer, chemicals, hired labor, 
irrigation, energy and other purchased factors). 
In the Cobb Douglas framework, the production elasticity for each input is equal 
to the share of each input to total cash receipts. The sum of all shares is equal to one. 
The production equations are represented by a production function of the following 
form: 
(22) Q _ rrn=3 (Xa)a 1 . . . Si - Yi · J=1 ij , 
For i= food, feed and oilseeds; and j= chemicals, fertilizer, hired labor, irrigation, 
energy, other purchased inputs and non purchased inputs. The quantity of commodity i ( 
QsJ is a function of ~d which is the quantity ofinputj required to produced commodity 
i; clj, the elasticity of production ofinputj in commodity i; and y, the constant.for the 
production function of commodity i. 
In the CES framework production of each of the three outputs (food grains, feed 
grains, and oilseeds) is also a function of the same seven inputs: irrigation, fertilizer, 
chemicals, energy, hired labor, other purchased inputs and non-purchased inputs. But 
factor shares are independent of output and are derived form the base year equilibrium 
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condition. The production function is algebraically described as 
(23) Q - ['t' ~ x-p,1-11P, 
Si - Yi ""'i uij ij ' 
i= Food grains, 2:feed grains. 3: oilseeds 
j= 1 :purchased inputs, 2:fertilizer, 3:chemicals, 4:hired labor, 
5:irrigation, 6:energy, 7:non purchased inputs 
Where Qsi, is output of commodity i, ~ is the quantity of input j used in the 
production of commodiJy iindexed over j ,Yi is the efficiency parameter (Yi > 0), ~ii is 
the distribution parameter of input j from commodity i , · p; is the substitution parameter 
in commodity i (-1 <pJ. 
Commodity demand equations 
In both frameworks, demand for each commodity is assumed to be a 
multiplicative function of the consumer price of all commodities, and is represented by 
constant elasticity functions. Commodities are linked in these equations through cross 
price elasticities of demand. Therefore, substitution among commodities is allowed for 
consumers. Each demand equation contains a set of demand shifters, such as the level 
and distribution of disposable income, representing all exogendus variables affecting 
demand but excluded from the analysis. The value of the demand shifters is embodied in 
the base year, and since the policies examined are not expected to affect the value of 




Where, Qd; is quantity demanded of commodity i, µi is the demand constant for 
commodity i, Pei is the price consumers pay for commodity i and Ai is the own and cross 
price elasticities of the i'h commodity. 
Factor Demand. equations 
The factor demand equations are represented by the input demand equations 
derived directly from the first order condition for profit maximization.-. In the Cobb 
Douglas framework~ the equations are a function of the quantity of inputs, the factor 
share of the input and output prices as follows: 
dinp 
X d _ (p ij )-1 Q (25) ij - aij -- Si 
pqi 
In the CES framework, factor demand equations are also derived from the 
marginal revenue product (MRP) equation for factor {j) used in the production of 
commodity ( i) under profit maximization assumptions. The·derived factor demand 
equations are function of the output price, the factor price, the elasticity of substitution 
and the share parameters of the production function described by: 
Where Pd"Pthe price the producer pays for input j to produce commodity i, Pq; 
is the price producers receive for commodity /. 
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There are twenty one of these equations in each simulation framework, which 
have the same structure for all seven inputs and for all three commodities. Total demand 
for factor j in the food and feed grain and oilseeds sector (Xdj) equals the aggregation 
of the demand of input j use in food, feed and oilseed production . 
. c2s) x/ = r,ij X;f 
For i= food, feed and oilseeds; and j= chemicals, fertilizer, hired labor, irrigation, 
energy, other purchased inputs and non purchased inputs. 
Factor Supply equations 
The supply of inputs are represented by equations that are a function of the 
market price of the inputs exclusive of subsidies. There is only one supply function for 
each of the six purchased inputs. The market price of an input is the same across 
commodities. These equations are based onthe constant elasticity functional form: 
Where X I ij is the total quantity of factor j supplied to the producers, c;;j is the 
constant of factor j , Psinp is the market price of factor j across the sector and C is the . 
supply elasticity of factor j in the sector. The total quantity of factor j supplied xsj· in the 
grain sector equals the quantity demanded Of the factor in each commodity. 
(30) X/ =I, X;d 
In contrast, there is a separate supply function for the non purchased inputs 
(farmer owned) in each commodity market, 
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( ) X S _ ('D inp){J 31 ij - c:;;ij rSij 
Where X5ij is the total quantity of factor j supplied to the producers of the ith 
commodities , c:;;j is the constant of factor j , Psinp is the market price of factor j across the 
sector and ( is the supply elasticity of factor j in the sector. 
Export quantity equations 
The quantity of exports (Qx) is derived in the model as the difference between 
the quantity produced and domestic quantity consumed of commodity i. Gardner 
indicates that similar static models assume that the absolute magnitude of stocks will 
remain constant, therefore, stocks are not modeled to facilitate interpretation of the 
policy shocks. 
Price and policy linkage equations 
The policy structure of the model is embedded in.equations linking domestic 
(output) price to world price, and output price to factor price. As stated before, the 
support policies are introduced into an undistorted environment representing the 
equilibrium in the base year They are modeled in the form of ad-valorem subsidy 
equivalents that are represented by wedges in the price equations. 
Because the f~cus of this analysis is the effect of agricultural policies on income 
and trade, only three of the five categories of agricultural policies considered in the PSE 
calculations are included in the model: market price intervention support (mps}, income 
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support policies (incPay) , and input reduction cost subsidies (sub). 
World Price 
World price Pw; for commodity i is a function of U.S. exports of the i'h 
commodity. The equation is represented by a constant elasticity function: 
(33) Pw; = <I>; ( Qx; f 
where Qx; is the quantity of commodity i exported which is endogenously 
estimated in the model and ~; is the export price flexibility of commodity i. The price 
flexibility of export demand summarizes in one parameter the reactions of both exporting · 
and importing countries to an export quantity change by the United States. Other factors 
which affect world prices are represented in the constant. Export flexibilities were 
obtained from the AGLINK model of the OECD and are described in the model 
parameter section of this paper .. 
Producers price 
Producers price (Pq) is a function of world price and the per unit mps rate, a 
price wedge that represents any price intervention policy in the United States. Farmer 
decisions are affected by market returns and direct subsidies. 
(34) Pq; = Pw; + mps 
If the world price is lower than the farm gate price (positive mps ), then producers 
are effectively being subsidized. A negative transfer can occur when policies keep 
internal prices below world prices (e.g. export tax). 
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Consumer price 
Consumer price (PcJ is derived from the world price for commodity i. This price 
also contains several wedges. A wedge representing price intervention policies, 
consumer subsidies, other subsidies and loan rate programs that may affect consumer 
price. A positive (mps} indicates an implicit tax where consumers pay higher prices, 
either because of a price floor or the existence of export subsidies. When the loan rate is 
above the U.S. market price, consumers pay a higher price. When loan rate is below the 
market price, consumers pay the market price and government does not provide outlays 
for the loan rate program. 
In addition, the consumer price also includes direct subsidies (Csub) derived from 
demand enhancement programs13. Consumer subsidies are assumed to reduce the price 
of consumption. 
(35) Pc; = Pw; + mps - Csub +/- otherS 
Factor price 
Six prices characterized the factor price block; three for the factors that are 
purchased and three for those factors not purchased. The purchased factor price block 
includes: the factor market price, the factor supply price and the subsidy price provided 
to producers. The last one includes a price wedge that represents the support 
government gives to producers through input price reduction policies. The market price 
13 The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), Child Nutrition Programs (CNP), Commodity Supplemental 
Food Program (CSFP), Food Distribution Program for Indian Reservation (FDPIR), Nutrition Program for the Elderly 
(NPE) and Summer Camps and Charitable Institutions Program (Cl), Food Stamp Program (FSP) all subsidized 
consumers. 
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of the input in the free market is not affected directly by subsidies and is equivalent to 
the factor supply price: 
(36) p inp = Pm _inp sj J 
The producers' price of the input, is the market price less the price wedge 
representing the subsidy. Therefore, the program creates a wedge between the market 
price and the consumption price for the factor: 
(37) Pd.inp = Pm . .:..Sub/np J J . J ' 
In the non-purchased factor block the prices are: the shadow price of the non-
purchased factor, the factor supply price, and producers' cost for using the non-
purchased input for each commodity. The shadow price of the non-purchased input is 
not affected directly by subsidies to support income (e.g. deficiency payments) .and is 
equivalent to the non-purchased factor supply price: 
(38) D inp-non purch cr'h ·-' p . inp-non purch .. sij = ,.,, auow nceij 
The producers' input price, is the shadow price less the price wedge that 
represents the subsidy provided through income support policies ( e.g. deficiency 
payment). Income support subsidies are capitalized in the bundle of non purchased 
inputs (land and farm labor) and they are supposed to reduce the. shadow price of these 
inputs. Therefore, income support policies create a wedge between the market price and 
the price of consuming the factor. 
(39) Dd_i_np-non purch _ cr'h ·-' . inp-non purch _ S b inp-non purch _., lJ - ,.,, auow pnceij u sj 
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The difference between equations (25)-(26) and (27)-(28) is that there is a single 
supply and demand price for the jth purchased input and a different supply and demand 
factor price for non purchased inputs for each commodity. This means that changes in 
market conditions or rates can affect different groups of farmers differently. 
Market clearing ~quations 
The model has eight markets for each commodity: the market for .the commodity 
itself that includes the estimation of ~he level of exports and a separate market for each· 
of the seven factors of production. These markets are all in equilibrium at the beginning 
of the simulation through market clearing conditions used to enforce the equality of 
supply and demand in both commodity and factor markets: 
(41) O = (L,; ~;nonpurchased) _ xtoripruchased 
The model represents competition across the six purchased inputs across 
commodities. A single market equation is therefore used for each. 
Matrix Information 
The matrix approach permits the comparisons of specific policies and ( e.g. 
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market price support, input subsidies, direct payments, indirect measures) and their 
quantitative impacts on, trade, farm employment or transfer efficiency or other economic 
meaures. Even when the mix of agricultural policies differ among commodities with 
constant levels of total support, the PEM allows. for an approximation of the domestic 
and international impacts of the change in the policy mix. The PSE measure does not 
allow this flexibility. The matrix contains rows denoting the different support policies 
and columns containing the indicators that describe the effects of the various support 
measures. 
Ea~h entry in the table can be interpreted as an impact multiplier of effectiveness 
of the support component. The number of rows in a policy evaluation matrix depends on 
-
the number of policy instruments used to support farmers. The number of columns 
depends on the number of specific effects that are to be measured for each policy 
instrument. 
The interpretation of results forces the policy maker and the policy analyst to 
acknowledge the trade-off between the direct policy impact and the various indirect 
impacts. It is possible to include more than one indicator for measuring impacts within a 
particular component of support. 
Policy Regime and PSE Data in the Base Year 
The U.S. PEM simulation component is calibrated to represent the market 
conditions for 1995, the last year of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act 
of 1990 (FACT A 90). United States policy goals for FACT A 90 included price and 
income protection, income enhancement for farmers, as well as assurance of adequate 
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supplies of food and fibers for consumers. Supply controls, direct payments, and 
nonrecourse commodity loans were important components of the price and income 
programs. The FACT A 90 froze target prices, while commodity loan rates were based 
on 85 percent of a five year moving average of market prices. Greater flexibility was 
introduced that allowed producers to plant up to 25 percent of their crop acreage base to 
crops other than those for which the base was established. 14 
The PSE/CSE data base for 1995 includes this information in the form of the 
monetary transfers to the sector. The PSEs/CSEs indicate that total transfers from the 
government was $2.16 billion (Table 1). 
Table 1, U.S. Levels of Support 1995 
Food Grains Feed Grains Oilseeds 
Market price support US$1000 
Trade measures US$1000 172,497 0.00 0.00 
Direcl payments 
Deficiency payments US$1000 900,336 82,000 0 
Area and headage payments US$1000 0 0 0 
Disaster US$1000 0 0 0 
Diversion US$1000 0 0 0 
Storage US$1000 0 3,663 0 
Loan rate US$1000 4,960 28,461 16,312 
Loan deficiency payments US$1000 0 0 0 
Marketing loans US$1000 0 0 0 
PFC payments US$1000 0 0 0 
Reduction of input costs 
Capital grants US$1000 0 0.00 0.00 
Interest concessions US$1000 89,089 232,148 111,731 
Fertilizer US$1000 0 0 0 
Transport US$1000 0 0 0 
Insurance US$1000 134,248 180,705 68,267 
Irrigation US$1000 26,222 62,283 39,192 
Consumer Subsidies 
Consumption subsidies US$1000 49,451 18,222 1,586 
Source: OECD, 1997 
14 Under the 1990 FACTA, farmers were only required to plant 15% of their crop base to crops not receiving a deficiency 
payment (normal flex acreage), however they could also plant an additional 10% of their crop base to crops not receiving 
a deficiency payment (optional flex acreage). 
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Nearly half (46%) of the transfer from consumers and taxpayers to producers in 
1995 was through income support policies, in the form of deficiency payments. Market 
price support accounted for only 8% of the total monetary transfer and was given to 
food grain producers. Amongst the different "reduction ofinput costs" policies, interest 
concessions represented 20% of gross PSE, while insurance represented 18%. Finally, 
irrigation reached 6% · of the total amount transferred. From these transfers, food grains 
producers captured 62% of the government subsidies while feed grain producers and 
oilseeds producers received 27% and 11% of total transfers respectively. 
Model Parameters· 
The modeling component of the PEM simulates the economic interaction of 
demand and supply for three aggregate commodities (food grains, feed grains and 
oilseeds) and seven factors of production: irrigation, fertilizer, chemicals, energy, hired 
labor, other purchased inputs and non'- purchased inputs. · Commodity production is 
estimated using these factors with a Cobb Douglas technology and a CES production 
function. Mathematically, the Cobb Douglas functional form and the CES are 
homogenous and weakly separable, and their elasticity of substitution is a constant that 
plays an important role in· output. 
Factor shares of the seven inputs used in the productio11 of the three commodities 
in both simulation frameworks are presented in Table 2. Data from the Farm Costs and 
Returns Survey were used to estimate the factor shares and factor earnings for the three 
groups of crops analyzed in the Cobb Douglas framework The Farm Cost and Return 
Survey (FCS) is a multi frame stratified survey. It is conducted annually and provides 
historical estimates of costs, reflecting actual levels of input use, production practices, 
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yields, and prices as measured by surveys of producers and suppliers. The structure of 
the accounts separates cash expenditures (when factor of production are purchased) and 
non cash expenditures (when factor are owned). ERS combines in a single account the 
production cost and returns of farm operators and landlords. If a landlord pays a share 
of farmer's cost as part of a rental agreement, then those costs are added to the 
operator's cost and subtracted from the rental value of the land. Total economic costs, 
. including returns to all factors of production, are equal to the gross value of production. 
By assumption, the Cobb Douglas function is homogenous of degree one or 
iinearly homogenous. This implies that if all the factors of production are increased in a 
given proportion, output increases in exactly the same proportion. From Euler's 
theorem, it is assumed that if each input is paid its marginal product, the total product is 
exhausted. Each parameter directly indicates the share of output paid to the respective 
input. 
Therefore, factor shares are not independent of output. Since factor shares for 
the base year are calculated directly from the Farm Cost and Return Survey (FCS). 
Equation (32) is used to derived factor share of each input. 
Pdi.np * X 
I} I 
P; * Qs; 
Where PdtP is the price of the input,~ is the quantity used of the input, Pi 1s 
the price of the commodity and Qs is the quantity supplied of the commodity. 
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Table 2. Relative Factor Shares. Cobb Douglass Framework 
Factors wheat c. grains oilseeds 
Other Purchased inputs 0.31 0.32 0.37 
Irrigation 0.01 0.06 0.07 
Fertilizer 0.16 0.17 0.04 
Chemicals 0.04 0.08 0.11 
Energy 0.06 0.06 0.03 
Hired Labor 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Non Purchased in12uts 0.38 0.29 . 0.34 
In the CES framework, the factor shares are independent of output as a result of 
the homothetic property. Rather than focus on the factor shares, we focus on the 
derivation of the distribution parameter of each input. · · The distribution parameter ( 6ij ) 
is derived for each commodity using the factor shares data for the base year as 
calculated for the Cobb Douglas framework as follows; 
(44) psinp ={'o)a(~)1-a 
y~ Pd~np 
In the CES factor shares are a function not only of the constants y, 6 and a but 
also of the factor prices. (Table 3). 
Table 3. Relative Factor Shares. Cobb Douglass Framework 
Food Grains oilseeds 
Other Purchased inputs* 0.338 0.390 0.431 
Irrigation 0.002 0.00053 0.02612 
Fertilizer 0.160 0.179 0.046 
Chemicals 0.044 0.084 0.117 
Energy 0.064 0.057 · 0.036 
Hired Labor 0.030 0.025 0.028 
Non Purchased inQuts .· 0.394 0.298 0.357· 
*includes : seed, custom operation, repairs and other inputs 
Price elasticities of demand where obtained from AGLINK a simulation and 
econometrics model of the OECD. The own price elasticity of demand is higher for food 
grains than feed grains (table 4). 
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Table 4. Aggregated Demand Elasticities 
On quantity demanded of: impact of l % of change in price of: 
Food Grains Feed Grains Oilseeds 
Domestic Demand - Food 
Domestic Demand - Feed 
Domestic Demand - Oilseeds 







Factor supply elasticities were constructed form the little information that 
economic theory has about it. They are not result of empirical or econometric exercises, 
but rather, they are based on assumptions that no factor is completely fixed. The issue of 
fixity in agriculture has been widely discussed by Galbraith and Black, 1938 and Johnson, 
1956, indicating that in the short run, supply responses are not perfectly elastic, even 
though over time, labor and other resources can be withdrawn at relatively low cost to 
non-agricultural use (Gardner, 1987). Vasava and Chambers (1983) rejected the 
hypothesis that one or more factors are absolutely fixed in U.S. agriculture, even in the 
short run. Therefore, the model is assuming that other purchased inputs and hired labor 
are more mobile than fertilizer and chemicals. Non-purchased inputs, irrigation and 
energy are assumed to be the less mobile of the inputs. The values in table 5, represent 
the assumption described above. 
Table 5. Input Supply Elasticities 
Supply elasticity Other Purchased in~uts .· 0.9 
Supply elasticity Irrigation. 0.2 
Supply elasticity Fertilizer 0.4 
Supply elasticity Chemicals 0.4 
Supply elasticity Energy 0.2 
Supply elasticity Hired Labor 0.6 
Supply elasticity Non Purchased inputs 0.2 
Export demand elasticities and export price flexibilities were obtained from the 
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OECD. Cross price export flexibilities are assumed to be zero (Table 6). 
Table 6. Export Flexibilities 




-0.17 0 0 
0 -0.19 0 
0 0 -0.83 
Calibration of the simulation Component in PEM 
Some assumptions need to be incorporated in various variables and coefficients 
so that the model equations, which are essentially tautologies, hold for the data used in 
the base year calibration .. This is the case for the market clearing conditions·and price 
relationships. 
The model is calibrated to represent exactly the equilibrium for the. 1995 base · 
year for all the variables, parameters and constants (Table 7). The model variables 
include quantities and prices for crop production, demand, exports and the supply and 
demand for the inputs. 
Table 7. Base iearVariables 
Calibrated Variable 1995 FOOD FEED OILSEEDS 
Fann gate Price $It 167.18 127.55 248.75 
World Price $It 159.78 127.55 248.75 
Domestic Demand Price $It 168.26 127.42 248.71 
Producer Price $It 170.09 127.55 248.76 
Fann sales $000· 10,105,220 23,892,175 14,738,528 
· Consumer Sales $000 5,220,439 20,372,074 10;031,392 
Export sales $000 4,745,508 3,499;200 4,705,150 
Quantity of inputs 
other Purchased inputs units 3,283,694.02 8,969,750.28 6,060,776.13 
Irrigation units 8,513.26 33,391.80 390,488.72 
Fertilizer units 1,567,479.02 4, 144,293.60 658,233.15 
Chemicals units 439,704.50 1,954,533.46 1,673,908.48 
Energy units 635,545.59 1,329,735.75 515,256.28 
Hired Labor units 300,889.94 595,858.15 405,325.94 
Non Purchased inputs units 3,828,280.50 6,864,612.38 5,034,539AO 
The variables used for the calibration of other model variables and parameters 
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are: 
* the values of the prices and quantities of the commodities in the base 
year, 
* the values of the elasticity and flexibility parameters, 
* the share of the value of production going to each input in the base year, 
* the PSE data on support for the agricultural sector . 
Input prices are defined as unity(table 8) and quantities are calibrated to 
. ·-
correspond to the derived first order condition from the profit maximization function 
using the ~ariables and parameter of the base year. 
Table 8. In~ut demand and su~~ll'. ~rices · 
Price Demand of Inputs . . . 
Other Purchased inputs 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Irrigation· 0.6984 0.3883 0.9671 
Fertilizer 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Chemicals 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Energy 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hired Labor 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Non Purchased inputs 0.9966 0.9998 1.0000 
Capital 0.9946 0.9890 0.9935 
Insurance 0.9877 0.9916 0.9963 
Price Supply of Inputs 
Other Purchased inputs 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Irrigation 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Fertilizer 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Chemicals 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Energy 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Hired Labor 1.0000 .1.0000 1.0000 
Non Purchased in12uts 1.0000 · 1.0000 1.0000 
These prices will be inclusive of the per unit rate of the subsidies (table 9) that 
in the model's assumption decreases the price of the input. In this way, the quantity of 
each input is determined as the product of the factor share and the value of the 
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commodity produced inclusive of support to farmers. Therefore the quantity of inputs 
used is equivalent to the total value of sales of the commodity. This will allow the model 
to hold the assumption of zero profits for profit maximization because paying the 
marginal value of each input will exhaust profits. 
Table 9. Per unit rate of subsidy calculated at the index 
Subsidy to Output Food Feed Oilseed 
Trade measures 2.90 0.00 0.00 
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Income Enhancement 
Deficiency payments 0.0034 0.0002 0.0000 · 
Area and headage payments 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Disaster 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Diversion 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Storage 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
Loan rate 0.0012 0.0022 0.0040 
Loan deficiency payments 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Marketing loans 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
PFC payments 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Reduction of input costs 
Capital grants 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Interest concessions 0.0054 0.0110 0.0065 
Fertilizer 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Transport 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 
Insurance 0.0123 0.0084 0.0037 
Irrigation 0.3016 0.6117 0.0329 
Energy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Hired labor 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chemicals 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Other Purchased Inputs 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
General services 
Research ,advisory.training 1.7935 1.3512 2.6879 
Inspection 0.0530 0.0399 0.0000 
Pest. and disease control 0.5094 0.3838 0.7634 
Structures/infrastructures 4.4169 3.3276 6.6198 
Marketing and promotion 0.1722 0.1297 0.2581 
Consumer Subsidies 
Consumption subsidies 1.5938 0.1140 0.0393 
The parameters required for the calibration are different depending upopn the 
production technology applied. For the Cobb Douglas, the elasticity of substitution 
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which is sert to unity. For the CES the elasticity of substitution is set to 0.2. This 
allows a better way to perfom sensitivity analysis on the importance and sensitivity of the 
results respect to the substitution among inputs. The input supply elasticities (Table 
5)represents the position of the industry as a price taker in this market when they are set 
in the range of0.5-1, and they~recognize the scarcity of the input and the operation of 
the capital market wheri set to a range of 0-0. 5. The model is calibrated with all the 
subsidies based on the 1995 levels given in table 8. These rates represent per unit rates 
of the subsidy. The model solution indicates an equilibrium result of the shock 
introduced for 1995. 
Solution of the PEM. modeling approach 
Equations (11) to (28) are structured and arranged recursively so they are a 
function of 12 variables: six prices for purchased inputs (Pmj), three prices for non 
purchased inputs (PmjJ and the quantity of exports for the three commodities (QxJ. The 
model can therefore be thought of as consisting of eigth equations (21) to (28) in these 
12 variables with equations (11) to (28) being used to calculate the values plugged into 
the twelve market clearing conditions. The equations are coded in an spreadsheet 
following the structure described before and then simultaneously solved. 
Equations (29) to (31) are all expressed in excess demand form and a set of 
arbitrary starting values for the twelve variables defined above are introduced. These . 
values usually correspond to the levels of equilibrium of those variables before any shock 
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to the model. The built in algorithm15 in the spreadsheet is used to minimize the sum of 
the squared excess demand in each market, changing the values of the 12 function 
variables. 
ED 2 = ~ .(Ed. )2 ~ (Ed )2 (Ed )2 ( 45) · ~, ,_, . + ~; nonpurchasedinputs i + . nonpurchasedinputs j 
In equilibrium, ED2 is equal to zero implying thatthe excess demand in each 
market is zero. 
· EmpiricalResu)ts 
Agricultural support policies in the U.S. have transferred income from taxpayers 
to consumers and from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers. Furthermore, 
as indicated earlier, the impact of policies on the economic welfare of producers and the 
farm sector is likely to be different depending on the mix used. Using the PEM, an 
indicative analysis can be generated, which assesses the relative efficiency or 
effectiveness of individual pol~cy instruments or policies·using some standard 
companson. 
15 
Indicative Analysis of PSE components 
In this exercise, each of the policies analyzed is modified to an equivalent of $1 
An outline of the solve system of equations using the EXCEL software can be found in a work of MacDonald, Z 
(1996) 
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dollar change in the original monetary transfer level of 1995. This is done separately to 
income· support policies (in the form of deficiency payments), price intervention policies 
(in the form of market price support) and input reduction of input cost policies. Then, 
the effects on income and exports are evaluated at the margin. 
Our primary objective is to evaluate how changes in the policies affects farm 
income and the degree of trade distortion. Two indexes were developed to accomplish 
this task, one of income transfer efficiency and the other of trade distortion. These 
indices are the ratio of the total change in farm income or the total change in exports 
(value) divided by the total change in the producer subsidy equivalent: 
(18) 
. . h. Farm Income· 
Income Transfer Efficiency Index = -. ------
. l:,. PSE 
(19) Export Value Index 
= h. Export value 
APSE 
The income transfer efficiency index captures the portion of the transfer 
payments that actually increases farm income. The closer the index is to one, the greater 
is the efficiency of the policy. It is possible for the index to be greater than one when the 
policy is not only efficient but stimulates supply and demand in a way that raises prices, 
production or both. 
The export volume index measures the impact of a commodity specific policy on 
the quantity of exports of that commodity. The greater the index the greater the 
distortion the policy causes in the quantity of commodity exports. 
We concentrate on these two measures because.they represent two areas of 
current policy focus: raising farm income as a domestic policy objective and reducing the 
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level of trade distortion. 
Income effects 
In the model, farm income is defined as total revenue from the market (TR) 
minus the cost of inputs not supplied by the farmer plus any income support payments 
(deficiency payments). 
(20) FI= TR - (EPd:np *x;) + ( incPay) 
The implications for farm income of a $1 change in a monetary transfer through 
various components of policy are illustrated in table IO for the Cobb Douglas frame 
work. Several observations are apparent from the model results. 
Cobb Douglas Frame work 
First, a $1.00 change in transfer payments to the farm sector through any of the 
components of agricultural policy leads to a less than equivalent change in domestic farm 
income. The rest of the monetary transfer accrues either to other agents in domestic 
markets, foreign consumers/producers, or is lost as deadweight loss (inefficient use of 
resources). Why is this the case? Largely because changes in monetary transfers to the 
U.S. farm sector lead not only to changes in thelevel of support, but also to changes in 
supply and demand. These supply and demand changes differ in magnitude and 
direction, allowing for a different allocation of resources in the factor and commodity 
markets. Therefore, a policy can transfer support efficiently; but may also produce a side 
73 
effect that can be a negative stimulus to another sector, depressing output price or 
increasing input cost. 
Among the policies examined, income support policies are the most efficient 
means of enhancing producer incomes. A dollar of support transferred through direct 
payments changes farm income by an average of 84 cents. The large efficiency occurs is 
because this type of policy has little effect at the margin in prices or quantities produced, 
leaving the variable cost of production very stable. 16 However, this effect may be a 
result by design. We assume that income support policies did not affect production 
decisions. Income support policies were tied to a planted base acreage that would not 
increase even if producer decided to plant more. After that base, producer did not 
received any payment. However, farmers could plant less. Hence, income transfers did 
not influence output or price. If an investment or capital accumulation function is 
specified and the modelling approach introduces investment as an input, income transfers 
may have an output effect. 
The least efficient means of raising producer incomes is through subsidies to 
purchased inputs. A dollar of monetary transfer through subsidies to purchased inputs 
leads to different increases depending on the commodity. A $1 dollar expenditure on 
reducing input costs increases income by 15 to 40. However, these results are 
conditioned on the parameters assumed for the production function, especially, the 
elasticity of substitution ( which in this case is one assuming a complementary 
relationship among inputs) and the elasticity of supply of purchased inputs and non-
16 Deficiency payments can have different impacts if analyzed at the margin or average. 
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purchased inputs. 
Across commodities the results are similar in direction , but some differences can 
. . 
be noted in magnitude. Price intervention policies are more effective for transfering 
income to food grain producers than to any other _commodity producer, almost twice 
greater than feed grains and almost 3 times more than oilseeds. 
Input subsidies seems to be more responsive in the food grain s.ector, where they 
are more income efficient than in the other two commodities. Oilseed subsidies to inputs 
are the most inefficient in increasing income to farmers. 
Table to. Impact on Farm Income ofa $1 change in Various 
Com2onei1ts of Su22ort. Cobb Douglas Frame Work 
Food Feed · Oilseeds 
Income Support $ 0.849 $ 0.826 $ 0.869 
Price Intervention $ 0.405 $ 0.245 $ 0.137 
lngut cost reduction 
fertilizer $ 0.167 $ 0.028 $ 0.008 
irrigation $ 0.167 $ 0.068 $ 0.019 
chemicals $ 0.207 $ 0.024 $ 0.006 
hired labor $ 0.236 $ 0.073 $ 0.028 
energi I 0.200 I 0.029 I 0.008 
CES Framework 
Applying the CES framework, we can point out similar observations (Table 11). 
A $1 change in transfer payments to the farm sector through any of the components of 
agricultural policy leads to a·less than equivalent change in domestic farm income. 
However, it should be noted than in general, the transmission efficiency improved when 
the elasticities of substitution is less than one, as in the CES. 
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In the CES framework, income support policies are also the most efficient means 
of enhancing producer incomes among the policies we examined. A dollar of support 
transfered through income support policies increases farm income by an average of 84 
cents. This result is very similar to that of the Cobb Douglas framework. 
The least efficient means of raising producer income is through subsidies to 
purchased inputs. However; the multiplier effect is not the same iri all the commodities. 
When the multipliers are analysed across commodities, it can be noted that two inputs 
(chemicals and hired labor) in the food grain commodities reduce their income 
efficiency. The rest of the inputs improve or stayed the same across commodities 
Price intervention policies have the greater change when comparing results 
between frameworks. Their multiplier registered the higher increase due to the change in 
elasticity, increasing their transfer efficiency to farmer income an average of23 cents in 
each commodity. 
Table 11 • Impact on Farm Income of a $1 change in Various 
Components of Support. CES Frame Work 
Food-ces Feed-ces Oilseeds-ch 
Income Support $ 0.849 $ 0.831 $ 0.865 
Price Intervention $ 0.743 $ 0.517 $ 0.371 
ln11,ut cost reduction 
fertilizer $ 0.171 $ 0.028 $ 0.007 
irrigation $ 0.171 $ .0.197 $ 0.023 
chemicals $ 0.205 $ 0.025 $ 0.010 
hired labor $ 0.216 $ 0.035 $ 0.016 
enetg]l i 0.200 i 0.029 i 0.008 . 
Trade Effects 
The second set of experiments attempts to evaluate how the change of policies 
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affects the value of trade (exports). The trade impact index is being used as a proxy for 
trade distortion. The larger the impact of the policy on trade, the greater the distorting 
capacity of the policy. 
The effects of a one dollar change in the level of support on trade value by 
commodity and across policies are presented in Table 12 for the Cobb Douglas Frame 
work. The results suggest that, at the margin, support given through subsidies to inputs 
can be as distorting to trade as the support given.through market price support policies, 
the most trade distorting farm policy. A $1.00 change in input subsidies, changes export · 
value of food grains, feed grain and oilseeds around one to two cents per ton. 
A $1 change in market .price supportpolicies also increases the value of exports 
also by one to two cents. per ton. This result is very interesting because international 
trade organization have always focused their regulatory attention on market price 
support policies as the greater way to distort trade. But little attention has been put on 
the effects of domestic input policies. 
Income support policies in the form of deficiency payments are less distorting 
among the three policies analysed. Deficiency payments can be changed allowing the 
market price to change or legislating a new target price. If export demand increases 
driving the market price up deficiency payments decreases. If export demand decreases 
driving the market price down, deficiency payments increases. On the other hand, if a 
new farm act increase the target price and market loan rates remain constant, deficiency 
payments increase, but the effect on exports is undetermined. 
Across commodities, market price support policies are more distorting for 
oilseeds than for any other commodity, but input cost reduction policies seems to be 
77 
slightly more trade distorting when applied to food grains. 
Table 12 • Estimated impact on Trade volume (tons of exports 
_ of a $1 change in various components of support. Cobb Douglas Framework 
Income Support 
Price Support 
Food Feed Oilseeds 
$ 0.005 $ 0.003 $ 0.003 
$ 0.015 $ 0.016 $ 0.021 
ln9.ut cost reduction · 
fertilizer $ 0.008 · $ 0.005 $ 0.012 
irrigation $ 0.016 $ 0.018 $ 0.015 
chemicals $ 0.013 $ 0.008 $ 0.007 
hired labor $ 0.014 $ 0.013 $ 0.015 
energ~ I ·0.012. I 0.010 I 0.014 
CES framework 
The impact of policies on trade using the CES framework differs little form the 
. ' . 
. ' . 
results using the Cobb-Douglas (Table 13 ). Market price support and reduction input 
cost policies caused similar distortions in trade. Income support policies continue to be 
the least distorting policies applied. 
Table 13. Estimated impact on Trade volume (tons of exports 
ofa $1 change in various components ofsupport. CES Framework 
Food-ces Feed-ces Oilseeds-cb 
Income Support $ 0.005 $ 0.0032 $ 0.0032 
Price Intervention $ 0.015 $ 0.0157 $ 0.0209 
ln9.ut cost reduction 
.. fertilizer $ .,0.008 $ 0.005 $ 0.013 
irrigation $ 0.008 $ 0.022 $ 0.016 
chemicals $ 0.013 $ 0.008 $ 0.007 
hired labor $ 0.014 $ 0.012 $ 0.015 
energ~ I 0.012 I 0.009 I 0.01.4 
However, subsidies to irrigation seems to increase their capacity to distort trade 
across the three commodities. Why is this the case? As mentioned before, these results 
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are influenced by the parameters in the production function, the elasticity of substitution 
and the supply elasticity of inputs. There is a greater output reaction when the factosr of 
production not owned by the farmer are shocked through input subsidies than when non-
purchased inputs are targeted by income payments. Purchased inputs are modelled as 
being more responsive to price changes in the supply side than non-purchased inputs 
(higher supply elasticity). The input supply elasticity combined with the magnitude of 
the elasticity of substitu(ion results in greater output changes that directly affects trade. 
Conclusion · 
The modeling component ofthe Policy Evaluation Methodology is a multiple-
product, multiple input, partial equilibrium model that represents the interaction of 
demand and supply for three aggregated commodities: Feed Grains, Food Grains and 
Oilseeds. The PEM includes factor markets that are endogenously linked with 
aggregate supply and demand of the commodity groups. The model may be 
characterized as a static, deterministic, reduced form, supply and demand model with 
explicit factor markets. 
The PEM is designed to allow for policies having the same direct effect on 
. . . 
specific economic variables to have different induced effects on other variables such as 
trade, employment and domestic welfare. First, information from the PSE data base is 
disaggregated by policies and introduce into the simulation model . as price wedges. This 
requires knowledge of the effect of each policy analyzed. The, simulation model 
estimates the direct and indirect impacts of changes in the various measures of support 
described in the PSE on production, consumption, income and any production 
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indicators. Amatrix of the results is assembled with rows containing the different 
components of the PSE (ways of supporting or taxing farmers) and columns denoting the 
effects of the various support components on variables of interest to the policy maker. 
The PEM tool can be replicated easily and due to the fact that iot is coded in a 
spreadsheet, it is easily converted and analyzed. The modeling approach does no require 
a great amount of data from the countries and relies on the PSE data for creating the 
prices wages that identify policies in the model. . The PSE data brings uniformity to the 
comparison of analyz~s when the methodology is used. 
The empirical results for the United States indicate that the policies used to 
transfer support to producer are not I 00% efficient and that some level of dead weight 
loss is possible. Across policies, income support policies are the most efficient way to 
transfer income to the producer and are at the same time the less trade distorting 
policies. Input subsidies and price intervention policies can have similar effects in the 
trade arena, when analyzed at the margin. · This is a result to consider since input 
subsidies are not the target of international trade organization. 
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Applying the Policy Evaluation Methodology to Fair Act 1996 
Abstract 
The Policy Evaluation Methodology enables one to make a comparison of the 
impacts of agricultural policies on producers, consumers, taxpayers and trade. The 
approach separates the assumptions about input supply and input dernand elasticities and 
which markets are directly impacted by each policy. Wl1en analysing the effect of 
changes of the FAIR ACT, the effects of each policy applied individually is different 
from the effect of implementing the mix ofpolicies at the sarne time, and even more 
important, the increase or decrease in the amount of transfer given is not necessarily 
shown in the effects of· that support in the commodity market or the factor markets since 
policies use different price linkages to transmit their effect. However, this information is 
l.eft out of the PSE/CSE indicator. On the other hand, the mix of policies shows the 
presence of substitution and compensation effects producing income and trade 
distortions sometimes less severe than the application of the set of policies individually. 
This information is also left out of the PSE/CSE. 
Key Words: legislation, FAIR Act, PSE/CSE, Policy 
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Applying the Policy Evaluation Methodology to Fair Act 1996 
Introduction 
The Producer Subsidy Equivalent only measures the total level of support 
provided to agriculture and major changes in policies at equal levels of support may not 
be differentiated through this indicator. A Policy Evaluation Methodology is used to 
determine the impact of various levels and types of agricultural subsidies on agricultural 
producers, consumers and trade. This methodology account for the vertical and 
horizontal price linkages between agricultural markets.The PEM uses the components of 
the PSE as inputs to a simulation model that identifies the impacts of government 
transfers on several economic variables. Of great importance is the analysis of the recent 
changes in the mix of policies produced by the new farm legislation. 
Starting in 1996, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act 
accelerated the trend toward greater market orientation by reducing the government's 
involvement in agricultural markets. The reduction in government involvement was 
achieved through a change in both the level of support and the mix of policy tools (type 
of transfer payments). The FAIR Act eliminated subsidies tied to production and instead 
provided payments to producers regardless of their level of production, increased 
planting flexibility, allowed unrestricted haying and grazing, eliminated acreage reduction 
programs, reduced government involvement in the management of stocks ( by reducing 
the price support loan levels and the FOR entry levels), and eliminated multi-peril 
mandatory crop insurance. 
Prior to the FAIR Act, federal income support policies were tied to the 
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production of specific commodities. These support policies transfered income from 
taxpayer to consumers and producers in the market for that commodity. The new 
income support payments are tied to historic levels but have not production 
requirements. Thus, the new form of payments do not directly affect any specific market 
but may affect many agricultural and nonagricultural markets depending upon the 
associated expenditure patterns of the farmers. Even if the same level of support is 
provided with the new direct payment as was provided with the previous income support 
program, the market distortion that is created may vary considerably between the two 
policies. This kind ofeffect escapes the scope of the PSE/CSE. 
This paper applies the Policy Evaluation methodology to measure the effects of 
the changes in the policies and the mix of policies in several indicator of interest. The 
methodology uses the information supplied by the PSEs/CSEs as inputs into a positive 
model that includes the vertical and horizontal linkages between agricultural input, 
consumption and production markets to capture the intermarket trasnfer of subsidies. 
That is, the non-target groups (input suppliers, producers or consumers) of any policy 
will receive some benefits from the government support due to the varying levels of 
price transmission between markets associated with market supply and demand 
elasticities. Two types of measurements of the impacts of agricultural support policies 
are possible using the PEM. First, an analysis to assess the relative efficiency or 
effectiveness of individual policy instruments or policies using some standard 
comparison. Second, an evaluation of the impacts of specific changes in policy between 
two points in time. This analysis is summarized using a matrix of indexes that allow for a 
comparison of effects among policies and across commodities. 
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The methodology Structure 
To develop the PEM, a positive model of the agricultural sector was developed. 
The modeling approach retakes t~e partial equilibrium approach followed in the 
economic literature to represent the interaction of demand and supply for three 
aggregated commodities: Feed Grains, Food Grains and Oilseeds (Hicks, 1932, Floyd 
1965, Muth, 1965, Gardner, 1987, Hertel~ 1988, Gunter Jeong and White, 1996). The 
partial equilibrium enables measurements of the effect of supporting a single, relatively 
small sector of the economy, capturing the impacts within the sector. 
The modeling approach can be identify as an intermediate run static multiple-
product, deterministic, reduced form, multiple input, model that represents the crop 
sector in a given year and where the rest of the world is represented through export 
demand equations. The factor markets are explicitly modeled and are endogenously 
linked with aggregate supply and demand equations for the aggregated commodities. 
Factor markets are assumed to be traded domestically and competitively. 
Inputs are assumed to be freely mobile, with their prices·determined by their opportunity 
cost in non-farm activities. This serves to highlight the importance which factor mobility 
plays in determining the ultimate impact of farm policy. Within the context of the 
present analysis, the PEM is constructed to capture .the effects of changing the value of 
. . . 
different components of the PSE on the input~ output arid trade markets. Therefore, in 
terms of the model structure, the relationship among inputs and between input and 
output markets are importarit. These elements in the PEM model rely strongly on the · 
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single country models of Muth, (1965), Gardner (1985), and Hertel, ( 1988). 
The support policies are modeled in the form of either ad-valorem subsidy 
eq1,1ivalents or quantitative restrictions. This approach facilitates qualitative analysis and 
permits a close relationship to be drawn between policy.instruments in the model and 
support levels as measured by the PSE. 
The Policy Regime in the Methodology 
The basic model can be modified to simulate the effects of policies and programs 
in two generic ways: either as quantitative restrictibns or as changes in the support rates 
in the various markets. Quantitative restrictions on commodity supplied ~re appropriate 
for supply managed commodities while prograll)s such as the CRP may be represented as 
shifting factor supply functions. The treatment of policies and programs parallels the 
analysis of taxes in Layrad and Walters (1979) and Harberger (1962), described as 
creating wedges between selling and buying prices. Generally, programs which reduce 
the cost of inputs create a wedge between the buyer and seller price in the relevant input 
market. Commodity based programs are represented as creating wedges between the 
prices received by farmers and those paid by foreign and/or domestic buyers. 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent Data 
The PSE system is an accounting framework which records the amount of 
government expenditures on policies and programs and are deemed transfers from 
consumers to producers. One of the biggest advantages of this system is that it is readily 
comprehensible and may limit issues of debate to the general classification of each 
program and the amount of disbursements and transfers from consumers. 
88 
The PSE measures the level of support, and describes the type of policy 
approach the government is using. The different components of the PSE can offer data 
on the different policies used by the government to transfer support to producers or 
consumers. 
Implicit in the categorization and the allocation of prnducer and consumer 
benefits is an incidence analysis. The OECD distinguishes five types of agricultural 
policies that can be associated with the method of transfer used to del!ver their objective 
in the PSE. They are: market price support, direct payments, input subsidies, general 
services, a!ld other indirect support measures (Shelby, 1994). 
- Table 1. Policies included in PSE calculations 
Method of transfer Subsidy 
Measures that simultaneously affect producer and consumer prices e.g. Market Price Support 
Measures that transfer money directly from taxpayers to producers e.g. Direct Payments 
without raising prices to consumers 
Measures that lower input cost. with no distinction made between e.g. Reduction to input costs 
subsidies to capital and those to other inputs 
Measures that in the long term reduce cost but which are not directly e.g. General Services 
received by producers. 
Other indirect support, the main elements of which are subnational e.g. measures funded nationally by member states 
subsidies and tax concessions. · in the case ofthe European Union. Other Indirect . · 
SuoPOrt. 
In the case of market price support, income transfers occur because the domestic 
market price differs from the price at the border (world market price). In the OECD 
countries, the domestic price is usually higher than the border price creatin a transfer to 
producers. The total value of the transfer is measured by multiplying the relevant price 
89 
difference by the domestic volume of production. How this affects the governments 
budget is only an issue in so far as a difference exists between domestic production and 
consumption. Disregarding inventory fluctuations, this difference corresponds with 
international trade. The budget benefits from taxes on imports and is burdened by 
subsidies on exports. Transfers to producers from government programs may be paid 
entirely, from the budget, consumers or both. The key difference between market price 
support and direct payments is the source of the income trasnfer. With the price support 
consumer directly contribute to producer surplus whereas in the case of direct payments 
to producers, consumers do not directly contribute to producers. 
Price intervention measures the potential implications of domestic trade policies 
on market prices and support levels. Income support measures the amount of direct 
government payments received by producers of agricultural commodities (Nelson, 
1995).17 
The United States relied heavily on price intervention and income support 
policies in providing subsidies to producers ( Table 2) prior to the enactment of FAIR 
Act. Major market price support policies included export subsidy programs, import 
quotas, guarantee prices and tariffs. The U.S. market price support policies represented 
between 45-50% of total support transfers toU.S. producers over the last 18 years. The 
cost of market price support programs averaged $11. 646 billions per year for the period 
1979-1996, or 10% of the gross aggregated valued of agricultural production. The 
market price support programs for dairy and sugar, represented the largest share of 
expenditures on these programs. Guaranteed minimum prices were provided for 
17Trade policies often increased ( or decreased) the level of domestic market prices relative to world market prices. Price 
intervention is based on the difference between the relative world price and the domestic price. (OECD, 1997) 
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sugarcane and sugar beets, and by government purchase prices for dairy products. 
Direct payments as defined by the OECD accounted for a steady 20% of the 
transfer to producers between 1985 to 1994 due to the drop in prices around the world. 
They average 5% of total value of agricultural production or $6.046 billions per year 
during 1979-1996. The U.S. deficiency payments represented 65% of the total transfer 
of direct payments followed by diversion payments that account for 15%, disaster 
payments reaching 7% . 
Analysis of Producer Subsidy Equivalent Data for the Base Year 
The modeling component of the PEM is calibrated to represent the market 
conditions for 1995, the last year of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act 
of 1990 (FACT A 90). Major policy goals for FACT A 90 included price and income 
protection, as well as assurance of adequate supplies of food and fibers for consumers. 
Supply controls, direct payments, and nonrecourse commodity loans were important 
components of the price and income programs, and procedures were established to 
allow greater direction of production decisions from market signals. 
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Table 2. PSE Levels of Support for all Agricultural Commodities 1979~1996 
Detail of general policy measures : 
Adjusted , ... 1ue or production 
A. Market price support 
B. Ln1es 
C. Direct payments 
Deficiency po)fflOtlts 





Loon deficiency pa)menls 
Marketing }Olll18 
PFC po)fflOtlts 








E. General servk:el 
Researeh, adviso,y, training 
Inspection 
Pest and diseue control 
Structurcs/infmstructWC8 
Marketing and promotion 
F. Sub national 
G. Other 
Total other support (D+E+F+G) 
Gross total PSE 
X. Feed adjustment 





































1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1,991 1,992 1,993 1,994 1,995 
107,045 110,733 111,585 112,377 112,084 111,738 109,198 105,937 112,182 110,000 118,647 123,585 118,494 124,397 122,263 130,724 130,706 
8,775 8,626 8,709 9,833 10,772 11,762 14,321 15,432 15,9(,() 9,893 9,963 14,143 12,628 12,673 14,143 12,664 8,214 
o o o o ~1 -663 -165 -s10 -265 -36 o -8 -so -141 -161 -m -196 
64J8 1,175 1,964 2,049 1:2,360 4,767 6,946 14,313 1:2,9:23 8,071 6,091 6,961 5,478 6,657 6,:285 6,017 1,587 
94 38 716 1,171 1,119 3,330 4,740 10,806 10,418 4,240 4,969 6,417 5,096 6,075 4,277 5,271 1,516 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
109 611 348 16 l O O O O 2,825 887 135 283 312 1,757 596 5 
134 308 508 0 10,748 1,171 1,376 362 1,(,()() 622 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
m m ~ ~4 ~ 322 3m "4 D4 ~8 1~ m w 10 9 28 4 
0 0 -48 -76 17 -30 214 2,114 187 -35 -22 161 0 0 0 0 62 
0 0 -3 -15 -4 -25 13 53 -15 -I O 8 26 53 215 61 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 233 424 199 62 93 173 58 W1 26 00 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1,109 1,632 2,113 3,140 3,580 3,:249 3,501 3,380 3,480 3,:295 :2,"-'4 1,882 1,561 1,375 2,017 1,108 1,656 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1,006 1,386 1,869 2,851 3,189 2,856 3,033 3,112 3,347 2,635 2,074 1,714 1,287 1,122 1,063 1,097 1,085 




















































































































































































































































































































NdtgtglPSEWSSmnl ussma 14 lJS 15649 ,Z015 19 m 30,039 23301 28.845 J6.6ff 3,$699 2523J 23488 18.117 U&ll 26081 2U57 25113 lBfl 23 m 
Source: OECD, 1997 
The target prices were continued at the 1990 levels, commodity loan rates were 
based on 85 percent of a five year moving average of market prices. Greater flexibility 
was introduced that allowed producers to plant up to 25 percent of their crop acreage 
base to crops other than those for which the base was established. 18 
The PSEs/CSEs data base information for market price support, direct payments 
and input reduction cost policies indicates that total gross PSE (to producers) totaled 
$1.9 billion in 1995(first column, item VII, table 3). Nearly half (46%) of the total 
transfer from consumers and taxpayers to producers was in the form of deficiency 
payments. 
Market price support accounted for only 8% of the total monetary transfer and 
was received exclusively by food grain producers. Amongst the different items in 
reduction in input costs, interest concessions represent 20% of total transfers, while 
insurance represented 18%. Finally, irrigation reached 6% of the total transfer. Food 
grains producers captured 62% of the transfers while feed grain producers and oilseeds 
producers received 27% and 11 % of total transfers respectively. 
The OECD data base reports government outlays on loan rate for the base year. 
However, the information provided by the USDA on loan rate indicates that the average 
loan rate was below the market price during 1995 and 1996. The discrepancy is left for 
further research. For the use in the PEM, it is assumed that these subsidies correspond 
to storage and other handling expenses the government has to carry out from fiscal year 
to fiscal year, with no effect on consumer price . Therefore, affects of the loan rate are 
18 Under the 1990 FACT A, fanners were only required to plant 15% of their crop base to crops not receiving a deficiency payment 
(nonnal flex acreage), however they could also plant an additional 10% of their crop base to crops not receiving a deficiency payment 
( optional flex acreage) 
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not modeled. 
Policy regime under the Federal Agricultural Improvement Reform Act 
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 moves 
toward a greater market orientation by reducing the government's involvement in 
agricultural markets. This has occured as both a change in the level of support and the 
mix of policy tools. payments to producer regardless of their level of production, 
eliminated the relationship between income payments and current market prices, 
increased planting flexibility opportunities for the farmer, allowed unrestricted haying 
and grazing, eliminated acreage reduction programs, reduced government involvement in 
the management of stocks and eliminated multi-peril crop insurance as requirement to 
participate in the government programs. 
The transition from the FACTA 90 to the the Federal Agriculture Improvement 
and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 reflects the orientation of the new law· in the 
agricultural markets and the impact on the PSE components. Price intervention 
policies ( in the form of market price support programs) were set to zero for food grains, 
Income support policies (in the form of deficiency payments) were eliminated and a new 
policy instrument was created; the Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC} The policy 
changes were reflected in the PSE data base ( second column of Table 3). 
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Table 3. Changes in level of support 1995-1996 
FOOD GRAINS FEED GRAINS OIL SEEDS 
1,995 1,996 1,995 1,996 1,995 1,996 
I Levelofproduction '000 t 59,412 62,106 187,310 235,344 59,24 65,399 
8 
II Production price (fann gate) US$/t 167 158 128 106 249 239 
ill Value of production US$ mn 9,933 9,813 23,892 25,016 14,73 15,620 
8 
IV Levies US$mn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
V Direct PaymenlB US$mn 905 1,993 114 2,185 16 20 
VI Adjusted value of production US$mn 10,838 11,805 24,006 27,201 14,75 15,639 
5 
VII Gro"" total PSE US$mn 1,921 2,826 1,998 4,025 1,117 1,128 
A. Market price 8Upport US$mn 172 0 0 0 0 0 
Trade measures US$mn 172 0 0 0 0 0 
Other US$ mn 0 0 0 0 
B. Levies US$mn 0 0 0 0 
C. Direct payments US$mn 905 1,993 114 2,185 16 20 
Deficiency paymet\lB US$mn 900 0 82 0 0 0 
Area and headage paymenlB US$ mn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Disaster US$ mn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Diversion US$ mn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Storage US$ mn 0 0 4 0 0 0 
Loan rate US$ mn 5 7 28 39 16 20 
Loan deficiency paymenlB US$mn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Marketing loans US$ mn 
PFC paymenlB US$ mn 0 1,986 0 2,147 0 0 
D. Redudion of input coots US$mn 2S0 236 475 423 219 220 
Capital granlB US$ mn 0 0 0 0 
Interest concessions US$mn 89 76 232 180 112 113 
Fertilizer US$ mn 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transport US$ mn 0 0 0 0 
Insurance US$ mn 134 134 181 181 68 68 
Irrigation US$ mn 26 26 62 62 39 39 
Other US$mn 0 0 
E. General services US$mn 413 421 980 999 612 624 
Research,advisory ,training US$ mn 107 105 253 249 159 156 
Inspection US$ mn 3 7 7 0 0 
Pest. and disease control US$mn 30 22 72 53 45 34 
Structures/infrastructures US$mn 262 281 623 668 392 420 
Marketing and promotion US$ mn 10 9 24 22 15 14 
F, Sub n,.tional US$mn JSO 146 3S7 348 225 . 219 
G. Other US$mn 30 30 72 71 45 45 
VIII Gross unit PSE US$/t 32 45 11 17 19 17 
IX Gross 1!£1'Centa11e PSf; ~· 18 i4 8 is 8 7 
Source: OECD, 1997 
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Focusing on the changes to the mix of policies and price intervention policies 
between 1995 and 1996, the PSE indicates that the type of direct payments (income 
support policies)changed while increased the level of support for food grains from $900 
millions to 1. 9 billions. The level of support for feed grains also increase from $ 114 
millions to $2.18 billions. 
Since PSE is basically an accounting system, it can not give information about the 
impact or effects of the changes in the mix of policies. Moreover, the measures 
indicates that the United States is increasing their support to the sector. Transfers from 
market price supports, direct payments and input cost reduction policies reached $1.32 
billions in 1995 for food grains, but increased to $2.2 billions by 1996 an increased of 
60% over the 1995 levels. The increased level of support was even stronger in the feed 
grain sector. Transfers from market price support, direct payments and input cost 
reduction policies increased from $589 million in 1995 to $2.6 billion in 1996s. 
The income support paid to U.S. farmers prior to the FAIR Act was tied to 
production of specific commodities. This transfer could be viewed as a production 
subsidy. A deficiency payment rate was determined based on the diference between the 
legislated target price and the greater of the market price and the price support loan rate. 
This rate was then multiplied by the program yield and the number of elegible acres to 
determine the total amount of government payment. The program yield had until 1985 
been based upon an historical average but was frozen at that time. The elegible acreage 
was also based upon an historical average of acres planted or considered planted to the 
commodity. The 1990 Agricultural Law reduced elegible acreage by 15%. Thus the 
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deficiency payment rate was not applied to all production as actual yield often exceeded 
program yield and acres harvested exceeded acres elegible for program benefits. 
Nonetheless, the deficiency payment rate could be viewd as a per unit subsidy for 
production. As a production subsidy, the policy had a direct impact on the market. 
The new PFC payments do not affect any specific market as producers.are not 
required to produce output to receive the payments. The affect of the PFC payment to 
agricultural and nonagricultural markets depends upon the associated expenditure 
patterns of the farmers. Thus,. the same level of support for the PFC and the deficiency 
payments may have different market distortions impacts. 
The market distortion impacts include the net transfer of income to producers. 
Because the deficiency payment acts as a subsidy, market price is depressed and the 
producers lose a share of their payments to consumers in the form oflower prices. 
However, with the PFC producers will lose a portion of the payment only to the extent 
that their expenditures increase the price of goods and thus transfers income to 
producers of other goods and services. However, the PSE accounts both policies as 
having equal, dollar for dollar transfers, to producers. 
Using the PEM offers some more information about the real effects of these 
changes and goes beyond the accounting limitation of the PSE indicator. 
Empirical Analysis 
The move from FACT A 90 to the current legislation (FAIR ACT) represents a 
change in the mix of policies. In evaluating a particular change in policy mix the net 
effect for all the changes is measured. In this exercise, the levels of support given in 
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1995 are set to the monetary transfer levels specified in the 1996 farm legislation, 
increasing or decreasing individual policies. Later, all the changes are simulated one by 
one and compared to the total mix to measure the net impact of the mix of policies. The 
impact of policies on the economic welfare of producers and the farm sector is likely to 
be different depending on the mix used. 
To evaluate and translate the impact of the changes in policy to the policy maker, 
a series of indexes are designed to capture the principal impacts of changes in the 
economic variables of interest. The indexes are then presented in a matrix that allows for 
cross comparison by commodity. 
Income Transfer Efficiency 
The income transfer efficiency.index captures the portion of the transfer 
payments that actually increases farm income. The index is constructed as the ratio of 
the total change in income divided by the change in PSE transfers. The closer the index 
is to one, the greater is the efficiency of the policy. It is possible for the index to be 
greater than one when the policy is not only efficient but stimulates supply and demand 
in a way that raises prices, production or both. 
(49) 
1::,. Farm Income 
Income Transfer Efficiency Index = ------
1::,. PSE 
&port Value Distortion 
The export value index measures the impact of a commodity specific policy on 
the quantity of exports of that commodity. The index is constructed as the ratio of the 
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total change in export value divided by the change in PSE transfers. The greater the 
index the greater the trade distortion the policy causes in terms of the value of 
commodity exports. 
(50) Export Value Index = t:. Export value 
6 PSE 
Program drift coefficient 
Changes in policy usually reflects government goals of reducing or increasing 
expenditures on support programs; However, it is unlikely that the policy change will 
reach specific targeted monetary goals; A change in a policy will produce market 
adjustments in production sales and input use, as a response to the different subsidy rate 
introduced in the economy. The difference between the planned change in program 
expenditure and the actual change in expenditure produced is captured by this coefficient · 
( as a percentage planned expenditure) as a program drift. 
(51) 
PSEact - PSEplan 
Program Drift=~~~~--=.~ 
PSEplan 
Transfer share to Consumption 
This indicator is constructed as the ratio of the change in consumer surplus and 
the change on PSE. PSE calculations developed a relationship between market price 
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support policies and consumer indicating that market price support is an implicit tax on 
consumers. The transfer share to consumption is an indicator that shows the proportion 
of a transfer captured by consumers as measured through the change in consumer 
surplus. A reduction in consumer surplus due to a change in PSE transfers will indicated 
the increased in the implicit tax of the transfer, an increased in consumer surplus will 
show the consumer capturing part of the producer transfer. 
where 2Pci is the simulated price of commodity i and 1Pci is the base year price 
of commodity i. 
(53) 
_ t:,. Consumer surplus 
Transfer share consumption 
t:,.PSE 
Transfer Share to Input Suppliers 
When changes in the level or type of transfer to producers occur, input suppliers 
are indirectly affected by those changes due to the response of producer to purchase 
more or less inputs. An input supplier index is constructed as the ratio of the change in 
supplier surplus to the change in PSE. This index captures the portion of the transfer 
that producer transmit to the input market. 
(54) 
,;j ({1 + 1) ({j + 1) 
Supplier Surplus - (-J>s. - 1Ps ) ((/+1)· J J 
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where c;i is the constant of the factor supply equation for factor j; Ci is the supply 
elasticity of factor j; 2Psi is the simulated price of factor j and 1Psi is the base year price of 
factor j. 
(55) Transfer share supplier 
t:. Supplier surplus 
t:.PSE 
FAIR 1996 Changes in Deficiency Payments and Flexibility Contract. 
In 1996, the FAIR act eliminated deficiency payments and flexibility contracts 
were create. The amount ofincome transfers recorded in the PSE increased by more 
than $3 billion dollars from which food grain producers captured 31 % and feed grain 
producers received 69% of the new payments. The simulation component captures these 
legislative changes and the changing levels of support given. In the model, deficiency 
payments were reduced from $900 million to zero for food grain producers, and from 
$82.0 million to zero for feed grain producers. 
Flexibility contracts were increased from zero to $1,986.25 million for food grain 
producers and to $2,146.5 million for feed grain producers. These changes affected the 
per unit rate of subsidy andimpacted different markets.. The• flexibility contract, was 
modelled as a lump sum payment that is added to farmer income and at this. stage was 
assumed not to impactother variables of the model. 
The reduction in the deficiency payment and the introduction of flexibility 
contracts in food and feed grains increased food and feed grain income transfers, 60% 
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and 130% over 1995 levels respectively with a drift coefficient of0.01%. 
The combined reduction in deficiency payments and increase in payment through 
flexibility contracts made the efficiency multiplier very close to one. This simply 
demostrates the substitution effects of a policy that is efficicent in income trasnfer(PFC) 
for a policy that is not very efficient ( deficiency payments) 
An indirect gaiMer in this policy game was the oilseed producer. While the 
government did not directly transfer support to these producers, income for the sector 
increased almost $948 million. Trade multipliers indicate that some response to the 
change in income support policies accured in the value of exports for food grains which 
. . 
gained half a cent per ton for each dollar transfered to the sector. 
Table 4. Polici Evaluation matrix for the 1996 levels of Direct Pal'.ments 
Food Grains Feed Grains Oilseeds 
Transfer Share Consumption ·. $ -0.006 0.000 -0.000 
Transfer Share Supplier $ 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Income Transfer $ 0.997 0.999 0.000 
Value of Exports $ 0.005 ~0.001 0.000 
PSE Change % 61% 130% 0% 
Increase in income $1,000 1,081,915 2,063,138 948,000 
Increase in Export value $1,000 5,199 -2,702 54 
Change in Transfer (PSE) $1,000 1,085,644 2,064,992 9 
Gain Consumer Surplus $1,000 -8,599 84 -997 
Gain Producer Surplus $1,000 -6,103 -934 250 
Gain Supplier Surplus $1,000 410 -436 239 
Policy Drift % 0.01% 
Consumer surplus declined in the food grain sector as a result of the change by 
almost $8.0 millions from the base levels of value consumed before the change. This 
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indicates that a proportion of the deficiency payments was received by consumers ( one 
sixth of a cent per dollar on deficiency payment). In this exercise, flexibility contracts 
were modelled as a lump sum amount that increased income but it was assumed that the 
payments did not impact other variables in the model. Finally, the change in the 
supplier surplus was small indicating the small proportion of each policy that is received 
by the input suppliers. 
FAIR 1996 Changes in Market Price Support. 
-
From the 1995 levels, the FAIR act reduced market price support for food grains 
b!"inging the expenditure for this policy from $172.5 million to zero. Feed grains and 
oilseeds did not received any support from this kind of policy in 1995. The model was 
used to measure the impact of these legislative changes, reducing the amount of transfer 
given to food producer through market price support. 
The reduction in the market price support program of food grains had a targeted 
budget reduction of $172 millions in PSE transfers, but the market adjustments in 
production sales and input use in response to the change in the policy translated into a 
greater reduction in PSE transfer than that planned by the government (1.52% or $2.6 
millions more) (Table 5). 
Each dollar taken from the market price support program reduced food grain 
farmers income by 74 cents indirectly, 8 cents of the oilseeds farmers income was also 
lost .. As a result of the market adjustments, feed.grain farmer income was increased by 
14 cents. This is a result of the substitution effect through the demand side of the 
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commodities in study. In this case, feed grain was the indirect winner of the policy mix 
capturing some of the benefits of the reduction in PSE. 
With respect to trade, the greater response to exports isfound in the feed grain 
sector. Each dollar reduction in the market price support program increases the value of 
exports by almost 2 cents per ton. This is equivalent to the lost suffered by food grain 
exports, but much less than the combined loss in export value of food grains and 
oilseeds. 
Table 5. Policy Evaluation matrix for the 1996 levels of market support 
Food Grains Feed Grains Oilseeds 
Transfer Share Consumption $ 0.003 -0.211 0.087 
Transfer Share Supplier $ -0.201 0.046 -0.021 
Income Transfer $ -0.740 0.146 -0.083 
Value of Exports $ -0.017 0.018 -0.022· 
PSE Change 'll, -9.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Increase in income $1,000 -129,619 25,632 -14,468 
Increase in Export value $1,000 -88,658. 46,723 -859 
Change in Transfer (PSE) $1,000 -175, 148 164 -144' 
Gain Consumer Surplus $1,000 592 -36,879 15,216 
Gain Producer Surplus $1,000 -40,608 6,210 -3,820 
Gain Supplier Surplus $1,000 -35,245 8,064 -3,658 
Policy Drift 'll, 1.52% 
Feed sector consumers were also affected as a result of the reduction in market 
price support losing two cents per unit form their original consumer surplus level. 
Input supplier captured the loss suffered by the food grain producers in their 
market support program. In fact, suppliers lost 20 cents per each dollar reduced from 
the program. Again, this indicates that some of the support targeted for the producer is 
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captured by other agents in the economy. Feed grain suppliers were the. beneficiaries of 
the policy and because of the market adjustments they captured almost 5 cents per 
dollar. 
FAIR 1996 Net Aggregated Impacts 
The aggregated net impacts of the policies are illustrated in table 6. This table is 
the result of simulating. the mix of changes ( transfer levels )in the policy variables 
resulting from the previous legislation (FACT A 90) to the agricultural law (FAIR 96) 
The mix of policies had a total drift coefficient of22%. The intended total 
transfer from the policies simulated as reported in the PSE data base was $2.9 billion, 
however, total PSE transfer after market adjustments was $3 .23 billions. 
The transfer efficiency coefficient indicates that the mix of policies was more 
efficient in increasing feed grain income, where each dollar of transfer translated to 60 
cents of increased producer income. The efficiency in the food grain sector was about 
half of that in the feed grain sector. For the mix of policies, of each dollar spent to 
transfer income to producers, farmers in the food grain sector captured only 3 0 cents . 
The mix of policies llad a greater increasing trade value in the feed grain sector 
than in the other sector, increasing the value of exports two cents per ton for every 
dollar trasnferred. 
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Table 6. Policy Evaluation matrix for the 1996 levels of the policy mix 
Food Grains Feed Grains Oilseeds 
Transfer Share Consumption $ 0.085 -0.018 0.004 
Transfer Share Supplier $ -0.019 0.004 -0.001 
Income Transfer $ 0.305 0.645 -0.000 
Value of Exports $ -0.069 0.022 0.000 
PSE Change 'II, 68% 129% -2% 
Increase in income ., $1,000 988,295 2,088,341 -13,725 
Increase in Export value $1,000 · -83,395 43,980 -847 
Change in Transfer (PSE) $1,000 1,216,578 2,036:678 -16,446 
Gain Consumer Surplus $1,000 103,631 -36,788 14,111 
Gain Producer Surplus · $1,000 -46,740 5,155 -3,624 
Gain Supplier Surplus $1,000 -23,149 7,471 -3,470 
Policy Drift 'II, 22% 
The change in the policy mix allowed the consumers of food grains to capture 8 
cents for each dollar spent on to food grain producers. Feed grain suppliers captured a 
third of a cent per unit from each dollar spent. 
Evidently, the effects of each policy applied individually was different from the 
effect of implementing the mix of policies at the same time,· and even more important, the 
increase or decrease in the amount of transfers given was not necessarily shown in the 
effects of that support in the commodity market or the factor markets since different . 
policies used different price linkages to transmit their effect. Levels of support of U.S. 
measure through the aggregated PSE/CES showan increase from 1995 to 1996. Most 
of which is reported as income support. ffthis change is simulated as deficiency 
payments, the impacts will be higher than noting that the flexibility contracts do not 
affect production decisions. However, this information is left out ofthe·PSE/CSE. On 
the other hand, the mix of policies shows the presence of substitution and compensation. 
effects producing income and trade distortions sometimes less severe than the application 
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of the set of policies individually. This information is also left out of the PSE/CSE. 
Conclusion 
The Policy Evaluation Methodology enables one to make a comparison of the 
impacts of agricultural policies on producers, consumers, taxpayers and trade. Because 
of the numerous constraints, the approach taken was to use parameters estimated in 
previous work rather than estimating a new set of parameters. The approach separates 
the assumptions about input supply and input demand elasticities and which markets are 
directly impacted by each policy. The transparency of these two sets of assumptions in 
the model may also be a limitation of the model for two reasons. First, some countries 
may be without previous estimates and thus will require considerable work in estimating 
the parameters. Second, considerable room exists for disagreement over what market is 
directly affected by various policy instruments. Direct payments offers the best example 
of a policy which is not tied to a market transaction and thus can be placed into the 
model at several points. 
A limitation of considerable importance is the lack of vertical and horizontal 
market linkages in the model. Through these vertical and horizontal markets "support 
leakage" could be traced out of the market for which the support was intended. In the 
current PEM, the definition of consumer is aU markets downstream from the crop 
producer which includes several important agricultural industries including other 
agricultural producers (e.g., livestock, poultry and aquaculture) and agricultural output 
services (e.g., processors, transportation, storage). Each of these downstream industries 
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may be the beneficiary of farm price and income support policies. Further, some 
countries may pass considerable levels of income support to agricultural producers 
through subsidies to these sectors or industries while other countries may tax producers 
through policies which adversely affect the downstream industries. An extension of the 
PEM model to include these downstream agricultural industries and the policies which 
affect them constitute an improvement. 
The horizontal price linkages are also limited in the current PEM .. The 
measurement of input supply and demand elasticities is an area that is limited in previous 
research. The potential of these estimates to affect the magnitude of the outcomes of the 
PEM model is thus unknown . 
Based on these limitations and initial findings, we envision two areas of focus in 
terms of future PEM work. First, we need to included the downstream consumers that 
may be the beneficiaries of farm price and income support policies (e.g, livestock sector). 
Second, in co-operation with the OECD, we need to further disaggregate the direct 
income components of policies, focusing on those elements starting to gain prominence. 
To this end, we need to examine environmental and other rural area program payments 
and evaluate how they might be incorporated into the modeling framework. This 
requires more attention to be put on developing policy..;relevant indicators. Other areas 
that are crucial include employment indicators and simple indices of environmental 
impacts. Finally, linkages across countries should be designed allowing the model to 
capture the cross country analysis of the agricultural policies. 
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Producer subsldYE9ulvalents. Food Grains. United States 1979-1996 
Producer subsidy equivalents Units/ 1982 1983 
I Level of production 
II Production price (farm gate) 
Ill Value of production 
IV Levies 
V Direct Payments 
VI Adjusted value of production 
VII Gross total PSE 




C. Direct payments 
Deficiency payments 





Loan deficiency payments 
Marketing loans 
PFC payments 








E. General services 
Research,advisory,training 
Inspection 
Pest. and disease control 
structures/infrastructures 
Marketing and promotion 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































G. other US$ mn 109 84 86 68 55 30 26 39 29 30 33 23 23 30 30 
VIII Gross unit PSE US$/t 22 70 45 59 101 98 67 41 59 83 53 70 50 32 45 
1x gross percentage rse '4 , s 39 29 39 61 62 39 26 4§ §4 H i§ M , s 2i 
--N 
Producer subsldy_)i:gulvalents. Oilseeds. United States 1979-1996 
Produc:er ouboidy equiv- Units/ 1980 1981 1982 
I Level of production 
II Production price (farm 11"1•) 
Ill vaJue of production 
IV Levies 
V Direct Pa-ru 
VI Adjusted value of production 
VI Gron total P9E 

































Other US$ mn 

















Researdl,advisory,training US$ mn 
Inspection _US$ mn 
Pest. and disease control US$ mn 
structures/infrastructures US$ mn 
Marketing and promotion 
F. Sub national 
G. other 
VIII Gross unit PSE 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Producer subsid~ulvalents. Feed Grains. United States 1979-1996 
Producersubsldyequlvalents Units/ 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1,991 1,992 1,993 1,994 1,995 1,996 
I Level of production 'OOOt 208,300 209,200 106,000 194,500 225,200 209,600 181,145 125,204 191,158 201,535 189,876 240,729 160,943 256,630 187,310 235,344 
II Production price (farm US$/t 98 106 128 105 88 59 76 100 93 90 93 81 98 89 128 106 
gate) 
Ill Value of production 
IV Levies 
V Direct Payments 
VI Adjusted value of 
VII Gross total PSE 




C. Direct payments 
Deficiency payments 




























































































































































































































































































































































































Other US$ mn O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 
E. General services USS mn 408 434 296 427 450 328 324 347 675 732 ne 858 756 1,008 980 999 
esearch,advisory,training US$ mn 149 167 121 172 179 129 134 120 168 177 165 214 184 250 253 249 
Inspection US$ mn 16 7 4 2 3 5 2 1 4 6 8 7 7 8 7 7 
Pest. and disease con US$ mn 43 50 25 43 45 31 36 33 45 46 49 59 53 71 72 53 
structures/infrastructures US$ mn 185 193 138 194 209 149 142 183 444 488 . 521 556 495 657 623 668 
Marketing and promo US$ mn 15 16 8 16 14 14 10 11 13 15 16 20 17 22 24 22 
f. sub national USS mn 240 237 168 240 266 206 219 194 276 297 302 309 268 359 357 348 
G. other USS mn 212 250 136 197 181 136 76 49 93 73 89 82 48 67 72 71 
VIII Gross unit PSE US$/t 9 14 82 18 21 47 54 45 29 23 19 22 27 20 11 17 
1x gross percentage esE % 9 13 42 l § 21 4§ 4§ 34 2s 22 I 9 23 23 20 s Is 
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